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The  Process  of  Infation 
in  the  Labor  Market 
CHANGES  IN AGGREGATE  demand are the fundamental source of changes 
in  the price level. In the long  run, the supply of  resources determines 
the volume of real output, the quantity of money determines the nomi- 
nal value of  output, and the price level is the ratio of the two.  Econo- 
mists who disagree with Milton Friedman's famous dictum that "inflation 
is everywhere and always a monetary phenomenon" have doubts mainly 
about the mechanism linking monetary expansion to inflation. Underlying 
my discussion of the role of labor markets in the process of inflation is 
the hypothesis that an increase  in aggregate  demand raises employment and 
reduces unemployment. The economy then moves up and to the left along 
the Phillips curve and wages start to rise more rapidly. Finally, prices rise 
in the face of increasing  costs. If aggregate demand is stabilized at the new, 
higher, level, the economy comes to  rest with a correspondingly higher 
wage and price level. The inflationary bulge in real aggregate demand dis- 
appears as the process reaches its conclusion. 
The intellectually weak link in this description of the process of inflation 
is the Phillips curve. Most economists regard the negative relation between 
unemployment and wage inflation as a plausible empirical generalization 
without a firm grounding in economic theory. Recently offered theories of 
Note:  I am grateful  to David Lilien and Wynetta  McNeill for extensive  assistance, 
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the Phillips  curve  have  been rejected  in fairly  strong  terms  by macro  and 
labor  economists.'  Although  empirical  students  of the Phillips  curve  are 
generally  unsympathetic  to the search  theorists'  notion of unemployment 
and inflation,  they, too, often portray  the unemployed  as "bidding  down 
the wage  level."  Labor  economists  object  even  to this view on the reason- 
able  grounds  that  the labor  market  simply  does  not function  that  way.  The 
unemployed  never displace  the employed  by offering  to work at lower 
wages.  They  compete  with each other  for openings  for which  scale wages 
are already  established  through  collective  bargaining  or a bureaucratic 
personnel  policy. In turn, the most important  consideration  in these 
processes  is the wage  level in other  industries  or firms,  not the unemploy- 
ment  rate.  Economists  most familiar  with institutions  in the labor  market 
are precisely  those who are least convinced  by the hypothesis  that the 
unemployed  bid down  the wage  level. 
Wages  do in fact respond  to the unemployment  rate.  The Phillips  curve 
is well established  as an econometric  relationship.2  My purpose  in this 
paper  is to try to make economic  sense out of it in a way that is equally 
compatible  with  what  is known  about  institutions  in the labor  market  and 
with the fundamental  economic principle  that individual  agents always 
make  the best  they  can out of their  situations.  In my view  the theory  of the 
Phillips  curve  need  not rest  on institutional  constraints,  money  illusion,  or 
other  failures  of this fundamental  principle. 
The paper  follows the theme of my earlier  contributions  to Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity in  emphasizing the  role  of  turnover and 
mobility  in the operation  of labor markets.3  Its reconciliation  of rigid 
wage  scales  with  the sensitivity  of changes  in wages  to unemployment  runs 
1. See, for example,  James  Tobin's critical  remarks  in his presidential  address  before 
the American  Economic Association, "Inflation  and Unemployment,"  American  Eco- 
nomic  Review,  Vol. 62 (March  1972),  pp. 1-18, and Albert Rees' unfavorable  comments 
on a paper by Robert E. Lucas, Jr., and Leonard A. Rapping-"On  Equilibrium  in 
Labor  Markets,"  Journal  of Political  Economy,  Vol. 78 (March/April  1970),  pp. 306-10. 
The original Lucas-Rapping  paper was "Real Wages, Employment, and Inflation," 
Journal  of Political Economy,  Vol. 77 (September/October  1969),  pp. 721-54. 
2. As empirical  students  of the Phillips  curve have come to realize  the importance  of 
inflationary  expectations  in shifting  the curve, they have lowered their estimates  of the 
slope of the inflation-unemployment  relation. Every modern Phillips curve has some 
downward  slope, however. 
3. "Why Is the Unemployment  Rate So High at Full Employment?"  (3:1970), pp. 
369-402;  "Prospects  for Shifting  the Phillips  Curve  through  Manpower  Policy"  (3:1971), 
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as follows:  Rigid scales  can coexist with rapid  changes  in wages  because 
workers  change  jobs frequently.  The unemployed  are not an inert mass 
exerting  an inexplicable  downward  force on wages, but a  constantly 
changing  group of individuals  moving from one job to another.  If the 
labor  market  is tight, the unemployed  tend to find  jobs quickly,  and, on 
the average,  to get higher-paying  jobs than they held previously.  In slack 
markets  the opposite  is true.  Conditions  of supply  and demand  determine 
the unemployment  rate  and the rate  of wage  inflation  simultaneously,  and 
the Phillips  curve  emerges  as the locus of alternative  combinations  of the 
two. 
Plan  of the Paper 
The first section of the paper develops a two-equation  model of the 
process  governing  the evolution  of the wage  level.  The first  equation  deals 
with the adjustment  of the scale wage. It takes the form of a difference 
equation  in the  log of the  wage  with  an additive  term  that  varies  in response 
to the unemployment  rate. This equation  allows direct  expression  of the 
accelerationist  view that inflation  will rise without  limit if the unemploy- 
ment rate is held below an equilibrium  level. Under a certain  testable 
restriction  on its coefficients,  the difference  equation has the accelera- 
tionist  property.  The second  equation  explains  the observed  average  wage 
as a distributed  lag of past values  of the scale wage  multiplied  by a wage- 
adjustment  function. The two equations  together  predict  the course of 
the observed  wage,  given  values  of the unemployment  rate  which  is taken 
as determined  exogenously  by aggregate-demand  policy. 
I have estimated  the parameters  of the model in two distinct  bodies of 
data. The first pertains  to a group of highly unionized  manufacturing 
industries,  where  scale  wages  can be observed  directly.  The second  covers 
the whole  private  nonagricultural  economy,  where  the scale  wage  must  be 
inferred.  The two sets of estimates  agree on the essential points: the 
process  of wage  inflation  has a pronounced  accelerationist  tendency,  and 
the strict  accelerationist  property  is consistent  with  the statistical  evidence. 
The estimated  equilibrium  level of unemployment  is fairly  high-5.5  per- 
cent of the labor force at its 1974  composition.  Following  George  Perry, 
I use an unemployment  rate  that adjusts  for the secular  shift in the labor 
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elements  of the adverse  combination  of unemployment  and  inflation  facing 
policymakers  today:  (1) the increase  in the official  unemployment  rate  for 
a given  degree  of inflationary  pressure  associated  with the secular  shift in 
the composition  of the labor  force, which  has added  0.6 percentage  point 
to the unemployment  rate since 1964;  (2) the inheritance  of inflationary 
momentum  from the extremely  tight markets  of 1965-69,  amounting  to 
about 5 percentage  points of inflation;  and (3) the further  inheritance  of 
inflationary  momentum  from 1970-73,  amounting  to about 2 percentage 
points.  The third  component  is the most surprising:  in 1970, 1972, and 
1973,  labor  markets  were  tight enough  to add to inflation.  A reinterpreta- 
tion of recent  monetary  and fiscal  policy  emerges:  it is not that the "old- 
time  religion"  of contraction  was tried  and found wanting-it was hardly 
tried  at all. In the concluding  section I consider  four alternative  policies 
for the next  decade.  One ratifies  existing  inflation  for the indefinite  future 
by holding  unemployment  at its equilibrium  level  of 5.5 percent  of the labor 
force.  Two contractionary  policies  achieve  3.2 percent  wage  inflation  (the 
rate  consistent  with little or no price  inflation),  one in six years  with un- 
employment  at the 1961  level, and the other  in ten years  with unemploy- 
ment  at the 1962  level.  Restoration  of the wage  stability  that existed  in the 
early  sixties  would be a painful  process  under  either  policy. The fourth 
policy  sets the unemployment  rate at its average  level for 1961-68 and 
brings  about a mild acceleration  of wage inflation  in 1976 and beyond. 
None of the four  policies  yields  a combination  of inflation  and unemploy- 
ment over the decade 1975-84 anywhere  close to the stated goals of 
national  policymakers. 
Theory  of Changes  in Money  Wages 
The integrated  theory of the response  of the wage level to the supply 
and  demand  for labor  developed  in the first  half of the paper  draws  exten- 
sively on the thinking  of labor economists,  notably John Dunlop and 
Melvin  Reder.  They have pointed out the rigidity  of the scale wage, the 
implausibility  of a model in which potential  workers  negotiate  with em- 
ployers  over wages,  and the importance  of upgrading  and downgrading 
in response  to conditions  in the labor market.  The theory  draws  equally 
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recognizing  the importance  of mobility  in wage change,  and of the dis- 
tinction  between  the  equilibrium  and  disequilibrium  components,  a concept 
that appears  in the European  literature  on wage  drift  as well. Appendix  A 
presents  a systematic  discussion  of the relation  of the theory  to its ante- 
cedents. 
The theory starts from the observation  that, unlike the markets  for 
products  or financial  instruments,  the labor market  is characterized  by 
extreme  heterogeneity.  Because  many  different  kinds  of workers  might  be 
hired  for any particular  job, it is necessary  to make  a distinction  between 
the scale  wage  and  the effective  wage.  The  first  is the instrument  of bureau- 
cratic wage policies and, where workers  are organized,  the subject of 
collective  bargaining;  it can be measured  as the wage paid in the typical 
job. The second  is the cost to the firm  of adding  enough  labor  to produce 
one additional  unit of output,  and can be measured  as the wage  received 
by the typical  worker.  A major  point of the theory,  documented  below, 
is that the scale and effective  wages  lead separate  lives in the short run. 
I will argue  that the unemployed  are unable  to bid down the scale wage 
but that because  of the mobility  of labor among employers  and among 
jobs, they can bid down the effective  wage so that it declines  relative  to 
the scale wage in slack  labor markets.  The essence  of the Phillips  curve, 
considered  as a relation  between  the unemployment  rate and the rate of 
change  of the effective  wage,  is that workers  move from lower-  to higher- 
paying  jobs when  the unemployment  rate is low and the labor market  is 
tight, and from higher-  to lower-paying  jobs when the market  is slack. 
These movements  cause changes  in the effective  wage even though the 
scale wage  remains  fixed. 
JOBS,  WORKERS,  AND  THE SCALE AND  EFFECTIVE WAGES 
Consider  a typical  employer  with  a wide  variety  of job categories  and an 
equally  wide  variety  of grades  of workers.  A job category  is defined  by the 
type of work performed  and not by the specific characteristics  of the 
workers  holding  it, and a grade  of worker  is defined  by personal  charac- 
teristics  (age, experience,  education,  training,  and the like) and not by the 
job held. Productivity  is the result  of an interaction  of the characteristics 
of workers  and jobs. A particular  grade of worker  has a comparative 
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middle grades  will not have the skills to function effectively  in more 
demanding  jobs, and would find their own skills underutilized  in lower 
categories.  I will  suppose  that  there  are  M grades  of workers,  indexed  by i, 
and N categories  of jobs, indexed  by  j. Then I define  c(j)  as the grade  of 
worker  having  a comparative  advantage  in job category  j. Many different 
js have  the same  value  of c(j). I also assume  that the grades  run in order 
of productivity  from  low to high, and that adjacent  grades  are  reasonably 
close substitutes  for one another-in  other words, the comparative  ad- 
vantage  of grade  i over grade  i +  1 or i -  1 in a particular  job is slight. 
Finally, I assume that the wages for workers of grades 1, . . .,  M stand in 
proportions rl,  . .  .,  rM. The ratios r* define a  "wage structure" that I 
assume  to be reasonably  stable  in the short  run.  In terms  of job categories, 
the relative  wage of category  j is r0j.  A wage structure  among  grades  of 
workers  implies  a wage structure  among  categories  of jobs. 
The theory  characterizes  the wage and hiring  policies  of the firm  in the 
following  way: The firm  sets the wage by defining  the scale wage, s, and 
offering  wage  srC(j)  for job category  j. The firm  varies  wages  by adjusting 
the scale  wage  in such  a way that all wages  move in the proportions  given 
by the wage structure.  Having  established  these wages,  the firm  attempts 
to fill  its needs  for labor  by a search  procedure  that  takes  the  most qualified 
workers  available.  In tight  markets,  there  may  not be any grade  c(j) work- 
ers interested  in working  in category  j jobs, so the firm  must settle for a 
suitably  larger number  of workers  of lower grades. In slack markets, 
workers  of grades  higher  than c(j)  may be available  for categoryj. 
The firm  sets the scale wage  in advance  so as to try to hit the target  of 
hiring  grade  c(j) workers  into category  jjobs.  After  the fact, there  may  be 
slippage  in one direction  or the other.  A convenient  way to measure  this 
slippage  is to define  the effective  wage, w, as the scale wage that would 
have hit the target,  on the average,  in all categories  of employment.  Let 
w;  be the wage actually  received  by workers  of grade  i. The wage  offered 
for category  j jobs should  have been w0(j), the wage actually  received  by 
workers  of grade  c(j). Thus  w should  obey 
wrQ(,) =  WC(j) 
for each  job,  j. In terms  of workers  rather  than  jobs, this implies 
WI'  =  Wi 
for each  grade,  i. This  cannot  be satisfied  literally  for each  grade,  but if the Robert  E. Hall  349 
wage structure  is reasonably  stable, a w that satisfies  it in some average 
sense  will come close for each grade.  The natural  way to average  is to use 
weights  corresponding  to the employment  of each  grade  of worker,  say Li. 
Then  w should  obey 
w  z  rLi-  wiLi 
or 
B 
W  =  L 
the ratio  of the wage  bill,  B =  wiLi,]  to antindex  of labor  input,  L =  2rLs, 
measured  by weighting  each grade  of labor  by its relative  wage,  ri. 
Note that L is the natural  fixed-weight  index of total labor input. The 
effective  wage, w, measured  in this way is a reasonable  approximation  of 
what the scale wage, s, should  have been, and thus serves  as a guide  for 
future  revisions  of the scale through  collective  bargaining  or wage  policy. 
I will return  to the relation  over  time between  w and s, and to the general 
range  of problems  associated  with setting  the scale wage. 
Within  this  framework,  the basic  argument  of the paper  is the following: 
The  scale  wage  is determined  bureaucratically.  If it is set correctly,  workers 
with a comparative  advantage  in category  j are hired  into it, and the ef- 
fective wage is the same as the scale wage. If the labor market  is unex- 
pectedly  tight, workers  hired  into job j will be of lower grade  than c(j), 
but  they  will  be paid  the scale  wage  for  jobj. The  effective  wage  will  exceed 
the scale  wage  as a consequence  of the upgrading  of the labor  force  within 
the  job structure.  In unexpectedly  slack  markets  the opposite  happens  and 
the effective  wage falls short of the scale wage. Mobility brings about 
movements  in the effective  cost of labor  in the short  run even  though  the 
scale  wage  is rigid. 
The theory  has definite,  realistic,  implications  for the composition  of 
unemployment.  In slack  markets,  workers  displace  one another  down the 
chain of grades  because  of their new willingness  to work at the wages 
paid in lower  grades.  The lowest-grade  workers  have the fewest  opportu- 
nities  to displace  others,  and so are  disproportionately  represented  among 
the unemployed.  The wage and hiring  policies of employers  bring  about 
an allocation of unemployment  that is economically  efficient  (given a 
reduction in total output) but that shifts the distribution  of income 
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MARGINAL  AND  AVERAGE EFFECTIVE WAGES 
The previous discussion assumed implicitly that a firm hires its entire 
work force anew each year. Although a large fraction of the labor force 
does change jobs every year, the majority remain with the same employer 
from one year to the next.4 The process just outlined applies to the firm's 
gross additions to employment ("new hires" in the Bureau of Labor Sta- 
tistics data), not to its total labor force. The theory thus needs an addi- 
tional  feature, the  distinction  between  the  marginal and  the  average 
effective wage. The marginal effective wage (called w') is the cost of in- 
creasing employment, or the reduction in the firm's total cost if employ- 
ment falls. It varies in response to conditions in the labor market in the 
way discussed in the previous section. It corresponds most closely to the 
labor component of marginal cost that should be relevant in setting profit- 
maximizing prices. However, the marginal effective wage cannot be ob- 
served directly because labor  is  not  infinitely mobile.  Only  the  most 
recently hired employees receive today's marginal effective wage. Those 
hired several years ago have a somewhat different  marginal effective wage, 
depending on conditions in the market when they were hired. The average 
effective wage today, measured as the ratio of total compensation to total 
labor input, is the weighted average of  the  present and past marginal 
effective wages, with weights equal to the fractions of the labor force with 
various lengths of time on the job. 
These definitions of the three distinct notions  of  the wage (the scale 
wage, the marginal effective wage, and the average effective wage) underlie 
the structure of the model developed in detail in the next pages. In brief, 
the marginal effective wage plays a role closest to that of the unitary con- 
cept of the wage employed in previous theories of the Phillips curve. On 
the one hand, it responds most directly to excess demand or supply in the 
labor market, and on the other, it is the marginal cost of labor to the firm. 
The first equation of the model embodies the hypothesis that the scale 
wage is set each year to the expected level of the marginal effective wage. 
Later in the paper, I will show that this equation can be rewritten  in a form 
precisely analogous to the conventional Phillips curve, with the important 
4. One of my earlier  papers-"Turnover in the Labor Force"-discusses the sources 
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difference that it deals with the marginal effective wage and not an ob- 
served wage. The second equation relates the observed average effective 
wage to the recent history of the marginal effective wage. It has no precise 
counterpart in previous theories. 
Setting the Scale Wage 
Consider first an employer hiring in a competitive labor market. His 
goal each year is to establish a scale wage that is as close as possible to 
the marginal effective wage. He must therefore predict the marginal ef- 
fective wage for the coming year, so the issue of expectations enters the 
theory at this point. In the empirical work presented below, I have used a 
simple log-linear prediction equation: 
log E(w') =  E  log w', 
Tl1 
where E(w') is this year's predicted marginal effective wage.5 Then the 
theory holds that st is set equal to the projected marginal effective wage, 
so the basic equation for the scale wage is 
log st  =  E  f  log w  t 
I assume that the : coefficients sum to one. 
A central issue in the determination of the scale wage is whether a gap 
between this year's w' and this year's s, will appear if the economy settles 
into an inflationary path. Initially, it is precisely such a gap that sets off 
the process of inflation. Will the gap remain? The answer depends on the 
shape of the lag distribution, 4. Catching up-that  is,  closing the gap 
under persistent inflation-requires  an extrapolative element in the dis- 
tribution.  Extrapolation  occurs  when  the  distribution assigns  positive 
weight to the first differences of log w'__ One way to see this is to rewrite 
the equation as 
log s, =  log w'_: +  E  >yA  log w  . 
5. Many readers  have pointed  out, correctly,  that this part of the model is much less 
fully  developed  than  other  parts.  Rational  economic  agents  would use all the information 
available  at time t in projecting  E(w'), not just the history, wt..  The present paper 
tries to go as far as possible  with the autoregressive  prediction  equation, but does not 
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This  year's  marginal  effective  wage is projected  as last year's  w' updated 
by a moving  average  of past  changes  in w'.  Thus  the gap  between  the actual 
value of w' and st iS 
log w' -log  St =  A log w' -  >  log 
wI. 
On  a smooth  inflationary  path,  all of the A log w'  terms  will  have  the same 
value,  say m. Then 
log  we -  log  s,  =  m  -  5  y'm 
=  m(l  -  yT) 
The parameter  ,  is one minus  the sum of the y coefficients;  the gap will 
be zero if and only if  ,  is zero. If ,u  is positive,  inflation  will bring  about a 
permanent  gap, with consequences  for the real economy. In general,  , 
measures  the degree  of slippage  embodied  in the process of setting the 
scale  wage.  In terms  of the original  lag coefficients,  it is 
the first  moment,  or mean, of the lag distribution.  A distribution  with a 
good deal of catching  up will have a mean close to zero, which implies 
that  some of the coefficients  will be negative.  It would  not be surprising  to 
find a distribution  in which  f1 was substantially  larger  than one and all 
of the other  lag coefficients  were  negative. 
I will have more to say about the equation  for the scale wage in con- 
nection with my discussion of the accelerationist  hypothesis,  which is 
directly  related  to the degree  of catching  up in the process  of setting  the 
scale wage under  conditions  of persistent  inflation.  Discussion of other 
aspects  of the equation  logically  follows  the next two sections  of the paper, 
on the demand  and  supply  for labor  and  the determination  of the marginal 
effective  wage. 
How should the model incorporate  the setting of the scale wage by 
negotiation  between  the employer  and  a labor  union  representing  workers? 
I think this question  can be answered  without settling  the more funda- 
mental  issue of how collective  bargaining  affects  the wage  level. I assume 
that the basic  determinants  of the wage  bargain  are stable over  time-the 
monopoly  position of the firm, the monopoly power of the union, the 
substitutability  of other  factors  for labor,  and the like. Further,  both sides 
in collective  bargaining  have roughly  the same information  about future Robert  E. Hall  353 
output,  prices,  and  wages.  The bargaining  process  simply  reestablishes  the 
earlier  wage bargain,  ex ante, making  up for any departures  on account 
of recent  unforeseen  changes  in demand.  Negotiation  sets a scale wage 
that enters the employer's  hiring process in the way described  earlier, 
modified  by whatever  conditions  the union  is able to impose  to protect  its 
monopoly  position.  Strong  industrial  unions  in the United States  control 
hiring  into  jobs above  the entry  level by requiring  that they be offered  to 
union  members  first;  those  previously  laid off  from  the  jobs have  first  claim, 
then those holding the next lowest jobs on the ladder. Unions do not 
restrict  hiring  at entry  levels,  but usually  those hired  must  join the union 
after  a certain  length  of time.  On the other  hand,  in periods  of contraction, 
senior  union  members  may displace,  or "bump,"  those  holding  jobs below 
them  on the ladder.  Workers  at the entry  level  face the greatest  likelihood 
of layoff. 
If the union  is successful  in raising  wages  above market  levels,  the firm 
is insulated  from conditions  in the general  labor market.6  Long lines of 
workers  are always  available  for the  jobs that may be filled  from the out- 
side. Attention  shifts from fluctuations  in conditions  in the labor market 
to fluctuations  in the demand  for the products  of organized  industries. 
This seems appropriate,  for it is precisely  the most highly organized 
industries,  especially  those producing  durable  goods, that are the most 
sensitive  to cyclical variation  in economic activity.  In fact, it is only a 
slight overstatement  to say that cyclical variation  in output is confined 
to the durables  sector,  and that the cycle makes  itself  felt in other  sectors 
only through  the labor  market. 
One outcome of collective  bargaining  is to reestablish  an appropriate 
scale  wage  in the face of recent  mistakes.7  If last year's  scale  wage  was too 
low, the demand  for labor  will have  been unexpectedly  high, and the pro- 
cess of upgrading  and new hiring  at the entry  level will have taken  place 
recently.  The marginal  effective  wage  for the past  year  measures  the extent 
of the error.  In Appendix  B, I argue  that the union  would  have set a scale 
wage higher than the marginal  effective  wage turned out to be, had it 
6. The firm may still screen applicants  for the most qualified  available.  Restriction 
of hiring from the outside to entry-level  jobs limits the extent to which the firm can 
undercut  the union's effect on the wage by hiring new workers  of exceptionally  high 
quality. 
7. In each round of bargaining,  many other issues  are settled,  of course;  the division 
of compensation  between  cash wages  and fringe  benefits  is an important  example.  These 
are, however,  much less important  in the overall process  of inflation. 354  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1974 
known that demand would have been so high, but that the best it can do 
after the fact is to set the scale wage to the marginal effective wage. The 
essence  of  the  argument is  that  the  union  acquires responsibility for 
continuing the employment of the new members it takes on during an 
unexpected expansion. This obligation prevents it from seeking a  wage 
higher than the marginal effective wage. 
To  a  reasonable approximation, the  marginal effective wage  should 
function as a target for setting the scale wage under collective bargaining 
as well as in an atomistic labor market. The linear extrapolative model 
ought to serve equally well as a rough summary of the process of setting 
the scale wage in both  cases. The argument of  this section is no  more 
than an elaboration of a point made frequently in discussions of the effect 
of unions on the rate of inflation: unions cause high wages but not rising 
wages. 
EMPLOYERS' STRATEGIES FOR HIRING 
A key element in the theory of wage changes is the response of employers 
to changing conditions in the labor market. Employers look for bargains 
in the market-high-grade  workers willing to work at the quoted wage. In 
slack markets they find bargains more frequently and the effective wage is 
depressed. The extent and success of bargain-hunting is a major factor. 
If employers could interview  all unemployed workers in filling each of their 
jobs  each period, bargain-hunting would be perfect, wages would adjust 
instantaneously, the Phillips curve would be vertical even in the short run, 
and the unemployment rate would never deviate from a fixed natural or 
frictional rate. Plainly, the economy does not function this way and em- 
ployers are nowhere near this successful in locating bargains. 
In this section I will discuss an extreme model in which hiring strategies 
are severely constrained. This model has the advantage of exact compati- 
bility with a model of the behavior of the unemployed that I will present 
shortly. Suppose that the personnel department of the firm has an inner 
and an outer office. The inner office knows nothing about conditions in 
the labor market, and interviews prospective workers according to fixed 
rules. From the point of view of the worker or of an outside investigator, 
these rules have a certain randomness. The worker faces a set of prob- 
abilities of receiving offers for various categories of jobs, and these prob- 
abilities are the same whether the labor market is tight or slack. The outer Robert E. Hall  355 
office, on the other hand, knows the probability that a given inquiring 
worker will accept a job, and it knows how many will present themselves 
each day. In slack markets, the probability of acceptance and the flow of 
inquirers are both higher than they are in tight markets. The task of the 
outer office is to admit only the appropriate  fraction of the inquirers  to the 
inner office so that the hiring requirements of the firm will be met. In 
tight markets the outer office keeps long hours, posts a conspicuous help- 
wanted sign, and so forth. In slack markets, the outer office is open only in 
the early morning and looks  as uninviting as possible. This may be  a 
suboptimal way to  run a personnel department, but still it achieves an 
element  of  bargain-hunting. The  probability that  a  given job  will  be 
filled by a superior worker rises in a slack market because the probability 
of acceptance by the most desirable workers rises the most. A more astute 
personnel department  would admit more inquirers to the inner office and 
then make less favorable offers when labor markets slackened. However, 
considerable evidence suggests that the main difference between tight and 
slack markets is in the availability of jobs-that  is, in the frequency with 
which an individual looking for work locates a prospective job-and  not 
in the size of the wages paid for the jobs that are offered. Presumably, this 
is the outcome of efficient recruiting practices; it is simply too  expensive 
to expand the inner office to decide how to adjust job offers to take com- 
plete advantage of changes in conditions in the labor market and then to 
interview substantially larger numbers of prospective workers. 
LABOR SUPPLY  AND  THE BEHAVIOR  OF JOB SEEKERS 
This section describes a theory of the behavior of job  seekers in the 
environment created by  the hiring strategies of  employers as discussed 
previously. Job seekers are all individuals interested in new work, whether 
employed or not.  By definition, all of the unemployed are job  seekers, 
but when the market  is tight, many  job seekers  never become unemployed- 
that is, they retain their old jobs until they find new ones. There is a large 
flow of workers through the labor market each month. I will assume that 
Holt's law8 applies: the fraction of the labor force taking new jobs each 
8. Charles  C. Holt, "Job Search, Phillips' Wage Relation, and Union Influence: 
Theory  and Evidence,"  in Edmund S. Phelps and others, Microeconomic  Foundations 
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week is a constant, 4, independent of conditions in the labor market. In 
tight markets a large fraction of job  seekers remain employed, planning 
to quit when they locate a better job,  whereas in slack markets a large 
fraction have been laid off and are seeking new work involuntarily. 
In a great many cases job seeking is entirely passive. A worker simply 
remains in  contact  with the  relevant labor market, waiting for  an  at- 
tractive prospect. Relatively few job seekers spend long hours deliberately 
searching for work.9 This theory should deal with job-seeking activities 
apart  from active search. The basic lesson of recent theories of search-that 
job  seekers rationally spend many weeks considering alternative jobs- 
applies to  all their activities in  seeking new work. For  example, many 
workers who are laid off face a substantial probability of recall within a 
few weeks. Probably only a few of them have a good chance of locating a 
better job elsewhere. Their rational choice is simply to wait for recall. A 
satisfactory  theory should encompass waiting-for  an old, or a better, new, 
job-as  well as searching. 
The typical job seeker faces the following situation: There is a probabil- 
ity, p, that a job prospect will materialize each week. In terms of the model 
of the employer's personnel department,  p is the probability that at least 
one employer will admit the worker to the inner office, which varies ac- 
cording to conditions in the labor market. The main innovation in this 
theory is the working out of the implications of variations in the availabil- 
ity of work, measured by p.  Previous theories, whose treatment of  the 
behavior of job  seekers is essentially the same as mine, have taken p  as 
constant, thereby missing an important element in the explanation of the 
Phillips curve.10  Further, I take p as known to job seekers, and, in general, 
put much less emphasis on ignorance and mistaken expectations on the 
part of job  seekers. In this theory, it is the unavailability of work that 
extends the duration of unemployment when demand falls, not incorrect 
expectations of prevailing wages and especially not incorrect expectations 
about the relation between prices and wages. 
Since the story about the decisions of individual job  seekers tells little 
that is new, it is relegated to  Appendix C. The conclusion is that a job 
9. This point is documented  thoroughly  in Robert J. Gordon, "The  Welfare  Cost of 
Higher  Unemployment,"  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity  (1:1973), pp. 188-95, 
Appendix  C. Hereafter  this document  will be referred  to as BPEA,  followed by the date. 
10. Dale T. Mortensen,  "A Theory  of Wage  and Employment  Dynamics,"  in Phelps 
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seeker of grade i will end up taking a new job at an average wage of w,, 
given by 
w'.=  srg(p). 
As before, s is the scale wage set by employers, r; is the relative wage of 
grade i as given by the wage structure, and g(p) indexes the dependence of 
the individual's success in finding a high-paying job  on conditions in the 
labor market as measured by p. In tight markets, g(p) is greater than one 
and the new jobs  found by job  seekers pay, on the average, above the 
scale wage for grade i. In slack markets, g(p)  is less than one. The depen- 
dence of g(p) on p is the explanation of the negative slope of the Phillips 
curve in the short run. 
The relationship between the unobserved weekly probability of  a job 
prospect and the observed unemployment rate requires attention next. The 
probability, p, determines the related probability, h(p), that a worker will 
take a prospect in a given week; h(p) rises with p, because the increasing 
availability of work makes it easier to find a job, but not in strict propor- 
tion,  because in  tighter markets the job  seeker can  reject prospects he 
might have taken if p  were lower. For the unemployed, h(p) can be ob- 
served, if imperfectly, from the data on the duration of  unemployment. 
If all job  seekers went through a period of unemployment, the  relation 
between h(p) and the unemployment rate, u, could be derived from the 
balance between the number of unemployed taking work and the number 
of workers losing jobs: 
h(p)uL=  4L. 
Here L is the labor force; the left-hand side is the flow into jobs and the 
right-hand side is the flow out. The two flows are equal when employment 
is constant, and are very close even when it is changing, because the gross 
flows in the labor market exceed the net flows by  a wide margin even 
during the sharpest change in employment. Then 
1 
u  h(p); 
this is the familiar proposition from the theory of turnover that the un- 
employment rate is  the product  of  the  frequency and  duration of  un- 
employment. This relation between u and p  is  an  oversimplification in 
one important respect: as Perry has documented, only a fraction of job 
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tions in the labor market.11  Suppose the fraction going through unemploy- 
ment isf(p).  Then balance of flows into and out of unemployment requires 
h(p)uL =  Of(p)L, 
and the relation between u and p is 
u =  1(P)  h(1  ) 
Again,  the unemployment rate is the product of  frequency, 4f(p),  now 
considered negatively responsive to p, and duration, I/h(p).  "Perry's pot- 
hole"-his  metaphor for  the process by  which some  workers fall  into 
unemployment while changing jobs-only  steepens the stable, negatively 
sloped  relation between the  unemployment rate and  the  frequency of 
prospects. 
The last step in this section is to restate the basic conclusion about the 
response of individual  job seekers to conditions in the labor market, now 
indexed by the observed unemployment rate: 
w'  =  srig(u). 
Determination  of the Scale  Wage 
The first equation of the model relates the value of the scale wage to 
past values of the determinants of the marginal effective wage. The mar- 
ginal effective wage in the aggregate is 
_  Lisrig(u) 
E  Liri 
=  sg(u). 
The ratio of w' to s equals the function g(u). When the market is tight, u is 
low, g(u) exceeds one, and new workers earn above the scale wage. 
Substituting this equation for w' into the linear extrapolative model for 
the setting of the scale wage gives 
(1)  log St =  E  T [log St  +  log g(ut)  ]. 
11. George L. Perry, "Unemployment  Flows in the U.S. Labor Market," BPEA 
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The scale  wage  evolves  according  to a difference  equation  with  an additive 
term  that varies  in response  to demand  as measured  by the unemployment 
rate. 
Determination  of the Average  Effective  Wage  Rate 
The second equation  of the theory  relates  the observed  average  effec- 
tive wage to the past history  of the marginal  effective  wage. In deriving 
this equation  I assume  that the distribution  of the labor force by length 
of time on the present  job is fixed over time-in  any year, a fraction  00 
will have started  work  within  the current  year,  a fraction  4l last year,  and 
so forth.12  Promotions  and demotions  count as new  jobs in the definition 
of the distribution.  In tight markets  those who started  work  recently  will 
have been promoted  recently  or will have quit earlier  jobs, while  in slack 
markets  they  will  have  been  bumped  recently  or laid off earlier  jobs. I also 
assume  that  the wages  of workers  who remain  on the  job change  in propor- 
tion to changes  in the scale  wage.  Under  these  assumptions,  wt,  the average 
effective  wage  at time t, is the weighted  average  of the wages  received  by 
workers  classified  by time on the job, with the wage  received  by those on 
the  job r years  ago given  weight  4,.  The assumption  about  the application 
of scale increases  implies  that a worker  of grade i who started  work r 
years ago at wage w_, r. now earns 
Ss, 
His starting  wage  (the marginal  effective  wage)  was determined  by condi- 
tions in the labor  market  when  he started: 
tri  =  St_Tg(UtT')1i 
In terms  of observable  variables,  his current  wage  is 
S,g(U,-)ri. 
The average  current  wage of workers  of grade  i is the weighted  average, 
Witt =  ris,  E  0g(Ut) 
Tr0 
12. Strictly  speaking,  Holt's law implies that the distribution  should be geometric, 
with cT  =  (1  -  )r.  However, Holt's law wiU hold to a close approximation  even if 
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Finally, the average  effective wage for the whole labor force is the weighted 
average across grades of labor, 
Wt  E  wrL 
Er'L,,st  E71  Og(ut-T) 
(2)  i  r 
St  E  XTg(ut-) 
The Acceleration  Theorem 
The Acceleration Theorem, discovered and advocated by Friedman and 
Phelps, holds that the rate of inflation rises without bound if the unem- 
ployment rate is held below a critical equilibrium value.'3 At the equilib- 
rium value, any inherited rate of inflation will be sustained indefinitely. 
In the long run, the economy cannot trade more inflation for less unem- 
ployment. The conditions under which the Acceleration Theorem applies 
to the model of this paper can be derived in the following way. Consider 
a path with constant inflation at rate m and a constant unemployment 
rate: 
w  =  woemt 
St  =  soe'  t 
Ut =  Ui. 
The path must satisfy both equations of the model. First, 
log St =  A  [log  St,  +  log g(u T)], 
or 
log sO  +  mt  =  EAT  [log  sO +  m(t-r)  +  log g()]. 
This  gives 
log g(I)  =  m  E2  TAT 
=  mTh. 
Thus 
g(7)  =  e"'. 
13. Milton Friedman,  "The Role of Monetary  Policy," American  Economic  Review, 
Vol. 58 (March  1968),  pp. 1-17; and Edmund  S. Phelps, "Money Wage Dynamics  and 
Labor Market Equilibrium,"  in Phelps and others, Microeconomic  Foundations,  pp. 
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Recall  that  ,u  is the slippage  of the scale  wage  behind  the marginal  effective 
wage in the face of sustained inflation. If there is no slippage, then ,u =  0, 
g(u) =  1, and  the constant  unemployment  rate,  u7,  is the same  for all rates 
of inflation,  m. The equation  g(u*) =  1 defines  the unique equilibrium 
value of the unemployment  rate, u*. At this rate, the marginal  effective 
wage equals  the scale wage, implying  that expectations  about conditions 
in the labor market  are exactly  fulfilled.  Following Phelps,  I think this 
condition  deserves  the use of the term "equilibrium."  I avoid Friedman's 
term  "natural  unemployment  rate"  because  it seems  to suggest  that u* is 
a desirable  level of unemployment. 
In the rest of the paper  I will refer  to the condition  ,u  =  0 as the ac- 
celerationist  hypothesis.  It alone establishes  the Acceleration  Theorem  for 
the model. All that the accelerationist  hypothesis  requires  is that those 
responsible  for setting the scale wage extrapolate  any past history of 
smooth  inflation  into the future. 
The equation  for the average  effective  wage can be satisfied  for any 
constant  unemployment  rate, not just the equilibrium  rate, as I will now 
show, starting  with 
(2)  wt = St E- 4g(u-). 
On the inflationary  path, 
wo et  =  S  emt  E2 
q5  g(U), 
or 
wo=  sog(a). 
The level of the average  effective  wage lies above or below the level of 
the scale wage depending  on whether  g(u) is above or below one. If 
u =  u*, then wo =  so and so wt =  st: at the equilibrium unemployment 
rate,  all workers  receive  exactly  the scale  wage  along  any inflationary  path, 
provided  that workers  remaining  on the job receive  the full benefit of 
increases  in the scale wage.  When  the labor  market  is in disequilibrium- 
say, with the unemployment  rate  below  its equilibrium  value-w0 exceeds 
s0, and the average  wage  is above  the scale  wage  in every  year.  Nothing  in 
this equation rules out the possibility  of permanent  disequilibrium  with 
a constant  rate of inflation.  The Acceleration  Theorem  depends  only on 
the properties  of the equation  for the scale wage. 
This is a good point to sum up the theory  developed  in this paper  and 
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and the Phillips  curve.  The comparison  is clearest  if the Phillips  curve  is 
considered  in terms  of the marginal  effective  wage. Recall that 
St =  E(w'); 
the scale wage is set to the expected  value of the current  w'. The actual 
marginal  effective wage differs from s,  according to  the  adjustment 
function: 
Wt=  Sg(Ut) 
=  E(w')g(ut). 
Taking  logs and subtracting  log w'_1  from both sides, I get 
log w' -  log w>_1  =  log g(ut) +  log E(w') -  log w'1, 
or 
A log w  =  log g(ut) +  E(A log w'). 
The rate of change  in w', measured  as the first  difference  of its log, is the 
sum of the log of the wage-adjustment  function-and the expected  change 
in the log of wt-log  E(w') -  log w'_1.14 The standard  Phillips  curve has 
precisely  the same  form, 
A log w, =  f(ut) +  E(A log we), 
but deals  with  the wage  level itself  rather  than  the marginal  effective  wage. 
In the theory of this paper, the expected  change in the marginal  ef- 
fective  wage  is 
E(A log w') =  log E(w') -  log wt_ 
=  iS  $log  w"  -  log  w> 
=  log w>_ +  E2  YT A log w_  -  log w'1 
=  >  Alogwt. 
14. Not the change  in the expected  level, log E(w)  -  log E(w'-j). Instead of sub- 
tracting  log w,  from both sides, I could have taken first differences  to get 
log wt -  log  wt-1 =  log g(ut)  -  log g(uti)  +  log E(wt)  -  log E(wt-1). 
This is a valid implication  of the theory, but it obscures  the comparison  with the con- 
ventional  Phillips  curve  by making  it appear  that the change in wt depends not on the 
level but on the change in log g(ut). The -log  g(uti1) is actually canceled by the log 
g(ut-)  in the expression  for -log  E(wt-1). The rate of change of w' depends on the 
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The expected change is a weighted average of past actual changes, pre- 
cisely  as  in  the  standard theory.  In  both  theories,  the  accelerationist 
hypothesis has the form 2-y,  =  1, or  zrf3,  =  0. 
There are two  important differences between the two  theories. First, 
the theory of this paper formulates the adjustment process and the ex- 
pectations equation in terms of the marginal effective wage rather than a 
wage that  is  observed directly. Second,  the level  of  the expected wage 
(and  hence  of  the  scale wage) plays an  important role  in  this  theory, 
while it has no role at all in the standard theory. 
Empirical  Evidence  on Five  Manufacturing  Employers 
I  have calculated series for union  wage scales for  the following  five 
employers:'5 
Employer  Union 
Members  of the Clothing  Manu-  Clothing  Workers  of America, 
facturers  Association  of the  Amalgamated 
United States  of America 
General  Motors  Corporation  United Auto Workers 
General  Electric  Company  International  Union of Electrical 
and Radio and Machine 
Workers 
B. F. Goodrich  Company  United Rubber  Workers 
American  Viscose  Division,  Textile  Workers  Union of 
FMC Corporation  America 
As a measure of conditions in the labor markets of the five industries, I 
have used the proportion of blue-collar workers unemployed in the total 
U.S.  economy.  This measure is far from ideal, especially where unions 
are strong. Construction of measures  more directly related to the individual 
industries is clearly one of the next steps in this area of research, but it is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
The general form of the equation describing the evolution of the scale 
wage over time is 
log St =  E  [log S,  +  log g(ut-)]. 
15. For sources and descriptions  of the data used in this section, see Appendix D. 364  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1974 
The empirical  work  in this paper  uses the following  simple  econometric 
specification  for the wage-adjustment  function,  g(u): 
g(u) =  0-  i1 log u. 
Provided  VI is positive, this function slopes downward  and is concave 
from above, conforming  to most prior  views about the curvature  of the 
Phillips  curve.  I have avoided  imposing  any strong specification  on the 
lag distribution,  X3,  beyond truncating  it after three  years.  The equation 
is then 
log s, = 13 [log  s-l  +  log (4/0  -  i1&  log u_I)] 
+  02  [log  St-2  +  log (4o -  i11 log uI2)] 
+  (1 -  31  -  02)  [log  St-3  +  log (i10  -  fV1  log ut-3)]. 
The first  moment  of the lag distribution, 
A =  3i +  232 +  3(1  -  1  -  2), 
which plays a crucial  role in testing the accelerationist  hypothesis,  can 
be examined  directly  by substituting  its definition  into the equation  to 
eliminate  02: 
(la)  log St =  01 [log  s-l  +  log ('Io  -  i'  log u'-i)] 
+  (3  -  201  -  A)  [log St-2  +  log (10  -  i110 log ut-2)] 
+  (j1  +  A -  2) [log  St-3  +  log (/o  -  fV1 log uI3)]. 
This equation  is mildly  nonlinear  in its parameters,  but I found no diffi- 
culty  in estimating  them  by nonlinear  least squares. 
Results obtained  from estimating  separate  equations  for the five em- 
ployers  did  not suggest  that  the parameters  of the equation  differed  system- 
atically  among  them, so I imposed  the hypothesis  that the same lag dis- 
tribution  and wage-adjustment  function prevailed  for all of them. This 
brought  sixty observations  to bear on the estimation  of the four param- 
eters.16  The results  appear  in Table 1. The first  lag coefficient,  ,13  =  1.53, 
16. As a first step equation  (la) was estimated  separately  for each of the five em- 
ployers.  The results  were suggestive  but hard to interpret  on account of the size of the 
standard  errors.  Inevitably,  estimates  of four parameters  derived  from only twelve  obser- 
vations will have a good deal of dispersion.  The first lag coefficient,  31, ranged from 
0.95 for American  Viscose to 1.75 for B. F. Goodrich; both had standard errors of 
over  0.40. The first  moment,  ,,  ranged  from  -0.27  for B. F. Goodrich  to 0.89 for Ameri- 
can Viscose,  with standard  errors  above 0.60. In no case was ,  more than 1.5 standard 
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Table  1.  Parameters  of the Scale  Wage  Equation  for Five 
Manufacturing  Employers,  Sample  Period  1961-72 
Parametera 
First moment  Constant  of  Slope of 
First lag  of lag  wage-adjust-  wage-adjust- 
Form  of  coefficient  distribution  ment  function  ment  function 
equation  i0  ,U  0 
,u  estimated  1.53  0.20  1.051  0.024 
(0.12)  (0.12)  (0.013)  (0.007) 
,  constrained  1.60  0.00  1.037  0.020 
to be zero  (0.11)  ...  (0.009)  (0.005) 
Standard  error,  by employer 
Clothing  manufacturers  (men's)b  0.023 
General  Motors Corporation  0.016 
General  Electric  Company  0.019 
B. F. Goodrich Company  0.010 
American  Viscose Division, FMC Corporation  0.033 
Sources: Derived from equation (la)  discussed in the text, using basic data described in Appendix D. 
a. The parameter  estimates are based on sixty observations. The numbers in parentheses are standard 
errors. 
b. Covers clothing manufacturers  affiliated with the Clothing Manufacturers Association of the United 
States of America. 
is  substantially  larger  than  one,  and  in  fact  the  other  two  lag  coefficients 
are negative.  From  equation  (la)  the  implicit  values  of  02  and  033  are 
02  3 -  203  - 
=-  0.26; 
3=  I1 +  -2 
=  -  0.27. 
In level  form,  the  scale-wage  equation  is 
log  s,  =  1.53 log  w'1  -  0.26  log  w't2  -0.27  log  wt3. 
favor of the accelerationist  hypothesis  was not at all powerful.  The slope of the wage- 
adjustment  function, q,, ranged  from 0.008 for General Motors to 0.023 for American 
Viscose,  with standard  errors  of 0.019 and 0.040.  Not even  the response  to the unemploy- 
ment rate was statistically  unambiguous.  When  the data were combined,  the method of 
estimation  took account of the correlation  among the residuals  for the same year. For 
details,  see E. Berndt,  B. Hall, R. Hall, and J. Hausman,  "Estimation  and Inference  in 
Nonlinear Structural  Models," Annals of Economic and Social Measurement  (forth- 
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The equation  embodies  a good deal of catching  up-the  negative  coeffi- 
cients  on wt2 and w_3 imply  that  st wil not fall behind  wt  even when  wt  is 
rising  rapidly.  The catching-up  property  may be revealed  more plainly  in 
the following  rewriting  of the same  equation: 
log s, =  log w'_1 +  0.53  A log w'_1 +  0.27 log w_ 
This year's  scale wage is last year's  marginal  effective  wage updated  by 
53 percent  of last year's change in the marginal  effective  wage plus 27 
percent  of the change  the year before that. The two coefficients  sum to 
only 80 percent,  so there  is a slippage  of 20 percent  of any upward  trend 
in wt. This slippage  is precisely  what is measured  by the first  moment  of 
the lag distribution,  ,u,  which  is 0.20. Its standard  error,  0.12, is sufficiently 
small to cast statistical  doubt on the strict accelerationist  hypothesis  of 
full catching  up, that is, A =  0. However,  the results suggest that the 
accelerationist  hypothesis  is not far from  the truth.  The scale  wage  catches 
up to within  20 percent  of its target,  and even  more  catching  up is statisti- 
cally entirely  plausible.  Imposing  the hypothesis  A =  0 further  reduces 
the standard  errors  of the other parameters,  as the second set of results 
in Table 1 shows. 
The wage-adjustment  function  in the constrained  equation  is 
g(u) =  1.037 -  0.020 log u. 
The equilibrium  unemployment  rate,  u*, defined  by g(u*) =  1, is 
u* =  exp [(Vt0  -  1) /  4t1] =  exp (1.85) =  6.4 percent. 
When  6.4 percent  of blue-collar  workers  are unemployed  in the economy 
at large, the labor market of the five employers  considered  here is in 
equilibrium  in the sense that the scale wage and the marginal  effective 
wage  are  equal  and  the employers  are  hiring  workers  of the expected  grade 
into their  new  jobs. This  level of unemployment  corresponds  to an overall 
unemployment  rate  of 5.1 percent,  a little  higher  than  most other  estimates 
but slightly  lower  than my estimate  in the next section  for the aggregate 
economy. 
The statistical  evidence  that union wage scales respond  to conditions 
in the labor market  is unambiguous:  the slope parameter,  461,  could not 
reasonably  be positive  solely  because  of random  sampling  error.  The ratio 
of the marginal  effective  wage and the scale wage responds  to the un- 
employment  rate  in the following  way: Robert E. Hall  367 
Unemployment  rate  Ratio of marginal 
effective wage 
Overall  Blue-collar workers  to scale wage 
3.1  3.2  1.014 
4.1  4.8  1.006 
5.1  6.4  1.000 
6.1  8.0  0.995 
7.1  9.6  0.992 
The second  equation  of the theory  relates  the observed  average  effective 
wage  to the recent  history  of the marginal  effective  wage: 
W t  -=  S  E  fT  t  / 
Again,  I assume 
t=  st(V0 -  V/1  log  ut). 
The equation  to be estimated  is 
wt  =  St  E  '(P'6O  /-  Vt1  log ut). 
The average  effective  wage, wt, is the wage received  by the typical 
worker.  If all workers  were the same, or if the composition  of the labor 
force never  changed,  it could be measured  as average  earnings  per man- 
hour. The first source of data used here is precisely  that: the series on 
straight-time  average  earnings  calculated  by the Bureau  of Labor Statis- 
tics, at the appropriate  standard  industrial  classification  level  for the firm. 
This is the narrowest  possible concept of the average  effective  wage; it 
departs  from the scale wage only because  of changes  in the composition 
of the jobs offered  by the firm. Nevertheless,  the results  of this section 
show that there are important  fluctuations  in the BLS series relative  to 
the scale wage, related  systematically  to conditions  in the labor market. 
The second source of data makes extensive  adjustments  for changes  in 
the composition  of the labor force to get the average  earnings  of the 
standard  manhour.  It is calculated  as the ratio of total compensation  to 
an index of labor input prepared  by Frank Gollop.17  Gollop's index 
weights  the various  age-sex-occupation  categories  by relative  wage rates 
and  by relative  annual  hours  of work.  The wage  derived  from  his measure 
of labor input is much closer in concept  to the average  effective  wage of 
17. "Modelling  Technical  Change  and Market  Imperfections:  An Econometric  Anal- 
ysis of U.S. Manufacturing,  1947-1971"  (Ph.D. dissertation,  Harvard  University,  1974), 
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the theory,  but it suffers  relative  to the BLS  series  in that it covers  a much 
wider  group  of workers  than does the scale wage: Gollop's wage covers 
both production  and nonproduction  workers,  and is calculated  at the 
two-digit  level, while  the BLS series  covers  only production  workers  and 
is available  at a much more disaggregated  level. Further,  Gollop's series 
includes  the imputed  value of fringe benefits,  which are excluded  from 
the BLS and scale  wages. 
In some  of the industries,  there  is a slight  upward  or downward  trend  in 
w, relative  to st,  the result  of long-term  shifts in the composition  of em- 
ployment.  Further,  Gollop's wage series is an index, set arbitrarily  to 
1.000  in 1958,  and  the straight-time  series  from  the BLS  is not on precisely 
the same  basis as the series  for the scale wage. In view of these consider- 
ations,  I have  added  a multiplicative  constant  and a trend  to the equation 
for the average  effective  wage: 
wt  =  ke"'S,  E 0T(/O-  1  log u") 
The coefficients  of the lag distribution  sum to one. I further  constrained 
the distribution  to be a trapezoid-that is, an Almon specification  with 
degree  one. The lag is assumed  to cover three  years.  The equation  finally 
estimated  was 
(2a)  w, =  keXtst  [+p  (60 - 61 log u,) +  3 (V0  l 
+  (2 
-  P0)  (4t1 
-  t'0o  log Ut-2)]. 
As in the case of equation (la),  I first estimated  the parameters  of 
equation  (2a) for the five industries  separately.  Again, it appeared  that 
joint estimation,  under  the constraint  that the parameters  were the same 
in all industries,  gave the most usable  results  (I did let each industry  have 
its own k and X).  The results  of the estimation  appear  in Table 2. With 
Gollop's wage series, the first lag coefficient,  Po,  is surprisingly  large- 
most of the response  of the average  effective  wage  to the marginal  effective 
wage  takes  place inside of a year.  The standard  error  of 4o is sufficiently 
large,  however,  that sampling  variation  alone may explain  its unexpected 
size.  The  lag distribution  estimated  from  the BLS  data  is quite  reasonable, 
suggesting  that about half of the labor force changes  jobs, receives  pro- 
motions,  or otherwise  benefits  from  wage  changes  apart  from  scale  changes, 
within  the first year after the market  tightens.  Another  third benefits  by 
the second  year,  and  the rest  within  three  years.  The  Gollop  wage  embodies 
substantial  cyclical  corrections  for the movement  in and out of the labor 
force  of low-wage  workers,  so it is not altogether  surprising  that the slope Robert E. Hall  369 
Table  2. Parameters  of the Equation  for the Average  Effective  Wage 
for Five  Manufacturing  Industries,  by Alternative  Measures, 
Sample  Period  1961-72 
Parameter" 
Wage  Constant  of  Slope of 
measure  First lag  wage-adjust-  wage-adjust- 
and  coeDcient  ment  function  ment  function 
industry  Io  o  O 
Wage  measure 
Gollop  0.83  1.097  0.058 
(0.18)  (0.031)  (0.010) 
Bureau  of Labor  0.54  1.061  0.023 
Statistics  (0.16)  (0.014)  (0.005) 
Standard  error,  by industry 
Gollop  BLS 
wage  wage 
Clothing  0.020  0.027 
Automobile  0.036  0.029 
Electrical  equipment  0.029  0.026 
Rubber  0.024  0.016 
Rayon  0.027  0.027 
Sources: Derived from equation (2a) discussed in the text, using basic data described in Appendix D. 
a.  The numbers in parentheses  are standard errors. 
of the wage-adjustment  function,  1,1,  is quite  large.  In the case of Gollop's 
wage,  sampling  variation  alone  cannot  explain  the discrepancy  between  the 
estimate  of 4,1  and the same  parameter  estimated  in Table 1: the estimate 
in Table  2 is almost  three  times  that  in Table 1. With  the BLS  data,  on the 
other  hand,  the estimate  of VI,  in Table  2 is in close agreement  with  that in 
Table  1. I am not altogether  sure  how to explain  the superior  performance 
of the conceptually  inferior  BLS  wage  in equation  (2a).  Mismatches  in the 
data  may  be part  of the story:  the unemployment  rate  is much  too aggrega- 
tive for the scale wage, but comes closer  to having  the same coverage  as 
Gollop's  wage. 
Taken  together,  the results  for the two equations  of the model for the 
five employers  and industries  give an internally  consistent  empirical  view 
of the process of inflation  that conforms in all major respects  to the 
predictions  of the  theory.  The  only  important  exception  is the  disappointing 
performance  of the quality-corrected  wage  in the equation  for the average 
effective  wage. Much more work will be required  to create  satisfactory, 
mutually  consistent  data on effective  wages. Finally,  while the empirical 
results  generally  support  the theory,  it would  not be fair  to claim  that they 370  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1974 
cast doubt on competing theories. I plan further work in testing some 
of  the  crucial points  of  disagreement among  the  alternative theories 
discussed in this paper. 
An Aggregate  Wage  Equation 
Although data on wage scales exist for the large fraction of the labor 
force employed by firms with more than a hundred or so employees, no 
comprehensive data exist on the scale wage for the whole U.S. economy. 
It is necessary, therefore, to estimate a single equation obtained by sub- 
stituting one of the two equations of the model into the other to eliminate 
the unobserved scale wage. Recall that in equation (2) 
wt  =St  E  OTg(ut) 
which gives 
wt 
E  0Tg(tit-T) 
With estimates of the lag distribution k and the function g(u) giving the 
response of the marginal effective wage to conditions in the labor market, 
it is possible to calculate the implied series for the scale wage from the 
observed values of the average effective wage. The result, say St,  can be 
substituted into the equation for the scale wage to give the one-equation 
condensed model, 
log S  =  E2  13T [log St-r  +  log g(u1t) ] 
Carrying out the substitution for st yields the equation finally estimated: 
(3)  log wt =  log [  O  E  k (0t  t1  log Ut-k)] 
+  E  /3 log wt  -  log  ['(k  (4{  1  log u_  k)  T  10-t,-10  Utk  t  ~~~~~~~k 
+  log (4/b  -  41 log ult,)}. 
The parameters of the wage-adjustment function that appears in the ef- 
fective-wage equation have primes to distinguish them from those in the 
scale-wage equation. 
For the aggregate average effective wage rate I have used a series calcu- 
lated by Peter Chinloy on the ratio of total compensation in the private non- 
farm U.S. economy to an index of total labor input.18 The index of labor 
18. "Issues in  the Measurement  of  Labor Input" (Ph.D.  dissertation, Harvard 
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input is constructed along the same lines as Gollop's indexes for manufac- 
turing industries,  and the resulting wage index accords fairly well with the 
notion of the average effective wage in the theory. As a measure of condi- 
tions in the aggregate labor market I have used a fixed-weight index of 
unemployment  by age-sex groups, UF. The weights reflect the contributions 
of the various groups to labor input: each group's weight is the product 
of its share in the total labor force, its relative hours of work, and its 
relative wage. Details appear in Appendix D. This measure of unemploy- 
ment derives from Perry's  work,19 but goes somewhat further in adjusting 
for the shifting composition of the labor force. Perry's unemployment rate 
counts unemployed  units of labor input in place of unemployed individuals, 
but shifts upward when all unemployment rates remain unchanged and 
the composition of the labor force shifts toward groups with high un- 
employment rates. Mine remains constant in the face of a shift in com- 
position. The official  unemployment rate rose about 0.03 or 0.04 percentage 
point per year relative to  Perry's index from the early fifties to the late 
sixties. For my unemployment rate the rise is almost 0.06 point per year. 
In  1974, an official unemployment rate of  6 percent indicates the same 
degree of tightness as 5.4 percent did in 1964. 
Table 3 reports the values of Chinloy's wage index, the fixed-weight un- 
employment rate, UF,  and the implicit scale wage,  St.  In calculating St,  I 
have held the lag distribution fixed with '0  =  0.50, ol  =  0.33, and 02 = 
0.17,  values that  are consistent  with  the  estimates for  manufacturing 
presented earlier. Further, I  held 44  arbitrarily at  1.144; this is just  a 
normalization and any other value would have given the same results. I 
estimated ,  by  finding the  value that minimized the  sum  of  squared 
residuals of equation (3). The best value was 0.099. The results for the 
estimation of equation (3) conditional on this value appear in Table 4. 
The first set of estimates yields a value for A, the first moment of the 
lag distribution of the scale wage behind the marginal effective wage, that 
is slightly but not significantly positive. The results are compatible with 
the accelerationist hypothesis, although some slippage of the scale wage 
behind the marginal effective wage under persistent inflation is also con- 
sistent with the findings. 
The other results are sharpened a bit by imposing the accelerationist 
hypothesis, A =  0, as the second set of estimates in Table 4 shows. The 
19. George  L. Perry,  "Changing  Labor Markets  and Inflation,"  BPEA (3:1970), pp. 
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Table  3. Wage  Index,  Fixed-Weight  Unemployment  Rate, 
and  Implicit  Scale  Wage,  1953-72 
Fixed-weight 
unemploy-  Implicit 
Year  Wage  index  ment  rate  scale wage 
Wt  Up  Si 
1953  0.829  2.6  0.792 
1954  0.855  5.1  0.843 
1955  0.866  4.0  0.861 
1956  0.908  3.7  0.902 
1957  0.965  3.8  0.954 
1958  1.000  6.3  1.013 
1959  1.038  4.9  1.056 
1960  1.083  4.9  1.103 
1961  1.102  5.9  1.128 
1962  1.123  4.9  1.145 
1963  1.152  4.8  1.170 
1964  1.210  4.2  1.216 
1965  1.243  3.6  1.234 
1966  1.320  2.9  1.287 
1967  1.371  2.8  1.323 
1968  1.467  2.6  1.403 
1969  1.574  2.5  1.497 
1970  1.717  3.7  1.661 
1971  1.810  4.5  1.789 
1972  1.938  4.1  1.932 
Sources: Wage index, Peter Chinloy, "Issues in the Measurement  of Labor Input"  (Ph.D. dissertation, 
Harvard University, 1974); also  see Appendix D  below;  unemployment rate, see Appendix D;  implicit 
scale wage, calculated  from 
we 
St 
E  0-  'PI  log  UfCT) 
with lag distribution  'o  -  0.5, O'  -  0.33, 02  -  0.17, ;o  1.144, ;pi =  0.099;  we is the average effective 
wage, and ut is  the unemployment rate. 
lag distribution  of the scale wage,  st,  behind  the marginal  effective  wage, 
wt,  implied  by the estimate  of #1 is 
log s, =  1.37  log w'_1 +  0.26 log 
w-2 
-  0.63 log w_3. 
In the extrapolative  form, 
log s, =  log w'_1 +  0.37  A log w'_1 +  0.63  A log w_2. 
The  slope  of the wage-adjustment  function,  determined  by the parameter 
4q, is indicated  by the following  calculations: Robert E. Hall  373 
Unemployment  rate (percent) 
Corresponding  Ratio of marginal 
Fixed-weight  official rate, 1974  effective wage 
UF  composition  to scale wage 
2.3  3.7  1.029 
3.3  4.9  1.012 
4.3  5.8  1.000 
5.3  6.8  0.990 
6.3  7.9  0.981 
Again,  there  is statistically  unambiguous  evidence  that effective  wages  de- 
part  from scale wages  in a way that is systematically  related  to conditions 
in the labor  market.  Some  examples  from  past years  will help to draw  out 
the implications  of the results.  At the equilibrium  rate  of unemployment,  a 
UF of 4.3 percent,  the marginal  effective  wage  equals  the scale wage.  Both 
1970 and 1971 were years of near equilibrium.  In the somewhat  tighter 
labor  market  of 1965,  with  UF at 3.6 percent,  it is estimated  that  the typical 
worker  took a new  job at about 1  percent  above  the scale  wage,  while  in the 
superheated  economy  of 1968,  with  UF at 2.6 percent,  the gap  was  more  than 
2 percent.  The model implies  that in the mild recession  of 1954,  with  UF 
at 5.1 percent,  new jobs paid about 0.7 percent  below the scale, and in 
the deep recession  of 1958,  with  UF  at 6.3 percent,  new  jobs paid almost 
2 percent  less than the scale. 
A second way to illustrate  the response  of wages to conditions  in the 
labor market  is the following:  Suppose  both the scale and effective  wage 
have been stable over time at, say, 100, and that the unemployment  rate 
Table 4.  Parameters of the Aggregate Wage Equation 
Parameter" 
First moment  Constant  of  Slope of  Standard 
First lag  of lag  wage-adjust- wage-adjust-  error 
Form  of  coefficient  distribution mentfunction mentfunction  of the 
equationi  '  I'o  regression 
,  estimated  1.31  0.13  1.074  0.040  0.014 
(0.18)  (0.20)  (0.015)  (0.009)  ... 
,  constrained  1.37  0.00  1.068  0.047  0.013 
to bezero  (0.16)  ...  (0.011)  (0.008)  ... 
Source: Equation (3), discussed in the text, using the value for 4,  (0.099) that minimized the sum of  the 
squared residuals,  where V14  is as defined in Table 3. 
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has  been  at  the  equilibrium rate. Then  in  year zero  an  expansionary 
policy reduces the unemployment rate by one point for a full year. From 
then on policy holds the unemployment rate at the equilibrium rate. This 
sets off the following inflationary spiral: 
Fixed-weight  Marginal  Average effective wage 
unemployment  Scale  effective 
Year  rate, UF  wage  wage  Level  Change 
-  2  4.3%  100.0  100.0  100.0  ... 
-  1  4.3  100.0  100.0  100.0  0.0% 
0  3.3  100.0  101.2  100.6  0.6 
1  4.3  101.7  101.7  102.1  1.5 
2  4.3  102.7  102.7  102.9  0.8 
3  4.3  103.3  103.3  103.3  0.4 
4  4.3  104.2  104.2  104.2  0.9 
5  4.3  104.9  104.9  104.9  0.7 
After a somewhat irregular pattern in the first few years, wage inflation 
settles down to  a rate of  about  0.8 percent per year for  the indefinite 
future. The policy that achieves the steady unemployment rate of 4.3 per- 
cent is one of continual expansion of aggregate demand; an attempt to 
stabilize the wage level would inevitably require that the unemployment 
rate rise above the equilibrium rate. 
It is instructive  to examine the response of wages to a policy that holds 
the unemployment rate below 4.3 percent for many years, starting from 
the stable conditions in the previous example: 
Fixed-weight  Marginal  Average effective wage 
unemployment  Scale  effective 
Year  rate, UF  wage  wage  Level  Change 
-  2  4.3%  100.0  100.0  100.0  ... 
-  1  4.3  100.0  100.0  100.0  0.0% 
0  3.3  100.0  101.2  100.6  0.6 
1  3.3  101.7  103.0  102.7  2.1 
2  3.3  104.4  105.7  105.7  2.9 
3  3.3  107.9  109.2  109.2  3.3 
4  3.3  112.4  113.7  113.7  4.1 
5  3.3  117.9  119.3  119.3  4.9 
6  3.3  124.6  126.2  126.2  5.8 
7  3.3  132.7  134.4  134.4  6.5 
Finally, it is useful to  look  at the story equation (3) tells about  the 
evolution  of the wage level over the past twenty years. Figure  1 shows Robert E. Hall  375 
Figure  1. Actual  and  Predicted  Wage  Index,  Private  Nonfarm  Economy, 
1953-72 
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Source: Derived from equation (3), discussed in the text. 
the actual and predicted  values for the wage index over the period of 
fit, 1953-72. The important  errors occur mainly in recession  years. In 
1961,  the wage  was overstated  by nearly  3 percent  of its level;  the equation 
predicted  a change  of 4.6 percent  over 1960  when  the actual  increase  was 
only 1.8 percent.  In 1967,  a smaller  error  in the same direction  occurred: 
the predicted  wage  is 2.2 percent  too high.  The predicted  change  over 1966 
was 6.1 percent,  against  an actual change of about 3.9 percent.  On the 
other  hand,  the prediction  for 1970  is slightly  too low and  for the sharpest 
recession  by far, 1958,  it is almost exactly  correct.  It is apparent  that a 
single  unemployment  rate  is not a complete  measure  of conditions  in the 
labor market,  especially  in recession  years. Some of the failures  of the 
equation  also can be attributed  to the use of annual  data. There  is no 
question, though, that the equation does a good job in tracking  the 
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Wage  Inflation  Today 
The aggregate equation projected a wage increase of  6.9 percent for 
1973 and a somewhat larger increase, 8.7 percent, for 1974 (based on the 
assumption that Up  will be 3.9 percent for  1974). Most  of this inflation 
is a hangover from the expansionary binge of  1965-69. The contribution 
of those years can be measured in the following way: First, project the 
evolution of wages from 1964 to  1974 using the initial conditions of 1963 
and the actual path of unemployment. Then repeat the projection with 
the fixed-weight unemployment rate set  to  the  equilibrium rate  of  4.3 
percent for  1964-69. The difference between the two  projected rates of 
inflation for 1974 is today's inheritance of inflationary expectations oper- 
ating through the mechanism setting the scale wage; it amounts to  5.8 
percent per year. In the Phillips curve diagram, this should be visualized 
as a vertical shift of the whole curve by 5.8 percentage points. Further, 
aggregate policy since 1969 has been expansionary enough to add signifi- 
cantly to today's inflation by shifting the Phillips curve even further up- 
ward. In 1973, the labor market was tighter than it was in 1965, and only 
in 1971 did the fixed-weight unemployment rate go as high as its equilib- 
rium value. The cumulated effect of tight markets in 1970, 1972, and 1973 
shifted the curve upward by another 2.1 percentage points, as measured 
by the procedure  just described. 
The worsening of the unemployment-inflation position of the economy 
since 1964 can be decomposed into three parts on the basis of these calcu- 
lations: First, according to recent projections, 1974  has 0.3 percentage  point 
more inflationary  pressure in the labor market than did 1964, as measured 
by the fixed-weight  unemployment rate; but these projections put the 1974 
official unemployment rate 0.2 point higher than it was in  1964. Second, 
something over 5 percentage points of the current inflation represents the 
inheritance of the acceleration that took place from 1964 to  1969. Third, 
the remainder  of about 2 percentage points reflects the further acceleration 
of 1970-74. 
Today's high rate of wage inflation is the result of a decade of continu- 
ously tight labor markets, even though the shift in the composition of the 
labor force has masked the tightness in recent years. The impression has 
become widespread, even among economists, that contractionary policies 
can no longer keep inflation under control. For example, Walter Heller Robert  E. Hall  377 
has  written:  "Why  should  the economic  game  plan  that  failed  so miserably 
in 1968-71  work  in 1974-75?  Tightening  the fiscal  and then the monetary 
screws  generated  6% unemployment  . . . [in]  1970,  yet failed  to subdue  in- 
flation."20  The results  presented  earlier  suggest that this is a misinter- 
pretation  of recent  experience.  Conditions  in 1970  and later were almost 
always  expansionary,  in the sense that labor markets  were tighter  than 
their equilibrium  levels, especially  in  1973. Contractionary  policy was 
tried  only  briefly  in 1971.  I think  it is unlikely  that it will be tried  again  in 
the next few years.  There  is very  little room between  the equilibrium  rate 
of unemployment  with  today's  labor  force  (estimated  at about 5.5 percent 
on the official  rate,  with a standard  error  of 0.29) and what I judge to be 
the congressional  intolerance  for rates  much above 6 percent.  In the next 
section  I discuss  several  alternative  policies,  including  two that are genu- 
inely contractionary.  Both have a distinct air of unreality  about them. 
Continuation,  and  perhaps  worsening,  of inflationary  pressure  in the labor 
market  appears  the probable  future  course  of the economy. 
Future  Wage  Inflation  under  Alternative  Policies 
A policy for aggregate  demand  that maintained  unemployment  at the 
equilibrium  rate of about 5.5 percent  of the total labor  force would  ratify 
the current  level of wage inflation  of around  8 percent  for the indefinite 
future.  The  implications  of such  a policy  for the average  effective  wage  are 
shown  in the first  column  of Table 5. Stable,  secular  inflation  of this sort, 
implying  price  inflation  of about 5 percent  a year,  is totally  without  prece- 
dent.  Its accommodation  would  require  a number  of reforms  of economic 
institutions,  including  the elimination  or adjustment  of controls  on interest 
rates.  The labor  market  itself  is already  capable  of adjusting  to a policy of 
stable  inflation:  the catching-up  property  of the mechanism  by which  the 
scale wage is set guarantees  that wages  do not fall behind  when inflation 
is fully  anticipated;  formal  cost-of-living  escalators  would  not be necessary. 
Some economic  policymakers  within  the federal  government  are reluc- 
tant to ratify 8 percent  wage inflation.  Increasingly,  their unhappy  ex- 
perience  with price  and wage controls  has convinced  them that the "old- 
time  religion"  of contraction  in the aggregate  economy  is the only  way out. 
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Table  5. Projected  Rates  of Wage  Inflation  under  Alternative  Policies, 
1974-84  and  Beyond 
Percent 
Fixed-weight  unemployment  rate 
Held constant  Held at  Held at  Held constant 
Year  at 4.3 percent  5.8 percentb  4.9 percente  at 4.0 percentd 
1974  8.7  8.7  8.7  8.7 
1975  7.8  7.1  7.4  7.9 
1976  7.6  5.2  6.5  8.2 
1977  7.6  4.4  6.2  8.4 
1978  7.8  4.1  6.2  8.7 
1979  7.7  3.0  5.7  8.9 
1980  7.8  3.0  5.4  9.1 
1981  7.7  3.7  4.0  9.3 
1982  7.8  3.1  4.6  9.5 
1983  7.7  1.7  4.2  9.7 
1984  7.8  2.6  3.9  9.9 
2000  7.7  2.6  2.9  13.3 
Source: Derived by author. 
a.  4.3 percent  is the equilibrium  rate. 
b. Held at equilibrium  rate plus 1.5 percent whenever last year's wage inflation exceeds 3.2 percent. 
c.  Same as note b, but unemployment  raised by only 0.6 percentage point (to the 1962 level). 
d. The average  level of unemployment  for 1961-68. 
There is no doubt the prescription  is effective.  The second column of 
Table 5 shows the results of a policy of strong old time-religion  that 
constricts  the economy to the point where the fixed-weight  unemploy- 
ment rate is 5.8 percent  for as long as it takes to drive  the rate of wage 
inflation  down to 3.2 percent  per year, approximately  the condition re- 
quired  for complete  price-level  stability.  Only in 1958 and 1961  has the 
unemployment  rate reached  this level in the postwar  economy.  Six years 
of extreme  slack in the labor market-the first  five and the eighth after 
imposition  of the policy-are  required  to bring wage inflation  down to 
the target. 
The Phillips  curve  is a curve  and not a straight  line, so it pays to take 
the old-time  religion  in smaller  doses over a longer period. In the third 
column of Table 5, I show the results  of a policy that holds the unem- 
ployment  rate only 0.6 percentage  point above the equilibrium  rate.  This 
rate (4.9 percent)  prevailed  in 1962.  Ten straight  years of this degree  of Robert  E. Hall  379 
slack brings the rate of wage inflation  down close to the target of 3.2 
percent. 
Finally,  it is worth  looking  at the implications  of a policy  that  maintains 
permanently  tight labor markets.  The last column of Table 5 plots the 
gradually  accelerating  inflation  that would accompany  a fixed-weight  un- 
employment  rate of 4.0 percent,  the average  for the Kennedy-Johnson 
years, 1961-68.  The cost is a rate of wage inflation  that is about 1.3 per- 
centage  points higher  in 1980,  2.1 points higher  in 1984,  and 5.6 points 
higher  in 2000 than when the unemployment  rate is held at 4.3 percent 
(first  column).  The process  of accelerating  inflation  takes many years to 
reach  the stage  of a wage  explosion. 
POSTSCRIPT  ON  THE ROLE OF PRICES  IN 
THE PROCESS OF WAGE  INFLATION 
Many readers  of earlier  drafts of this paper expressed  dissatisfaction 
about the absence  of a role for prices or expectations  of price changes 
in my treatment  of wage inflation.  The paper says nothing about the 
major  concern  today that increases  in the prices  of food and oil will feed 
back into the wage process,  shifting  the Phillips  curve even further  up- 
ward. I think it is premature  to deal with the issue of feedback on an 
empirical  level; even if there is substantial  feedback,  it will not appear 
fully in the observed  wage level for another  year or so. At a theoretical 
level, there is little agreement  about the mechanism  linking prices to 
wages. I will mention a few hypotheses  here, deal with some of them 
theoretically,  and indicate  some directions  of further  research. 
First, and easiest  to dispose  of, is the popular  view that labor can set 
the wage at any level it wants and will always  use this power to restore 
losses in the real  wage.  This  is no more  than another  manifestation  of the 
fallacy  that market  power  causes  inflation.  If labor  has the power  to raise 
wages,  why  wait  until  a price  increase  to exercise  it? No matter  how much 
concentration  exists on either  side of the bargain,  the wage is set by its 
objective  determinants,  and only if the price increase  is related  to one of 
these determinants  will it affect  the wage.21 
Robert  J. Gordon  avoids  the fallacy  of unused  market  power  by taking 
an index of product  prices  as the price  relevant  for the determination  of 
21. James  Tobin makes  exactly  this point in "Monetary  Policy in 1974  and Beyond," 
BPEA (1:1974), pp. 219-32. 380  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1974 
wages.22  Within  the theoretical  framework  of this paper,  Gordon's  view 
can be interpreted  as suggesting  an alternative  way to measure  the excess 
demand  for labor.  When  the product  price  exceeds  marginal  cost as deter- 
mined  by the wage  and the costs of other  inputs,  excess  demand  for labor 
and the other  inputs  appears.  A variable  that measured  the gap between 
price and marginal  cost could substitute  for the unemployment  rate in 
my equations.  In some  cases,  the alternative  would  very  likely  be superior; 
for example,  in the conditions  of late 1974,  coal miners  will surely  be able 
to drive  wages up in response  to the dramatic  increases  in the price of 
coal, and their unemployment  would not be a satisfactory  indicator  of 
their ability to do this. I have misgivings  about the usefulness  of un- 
employment  as an indicator  of pressure  on wages,  and have  already  begun 
work on alternatives  that are more directly  related  to the demand  for 
labor.  I want  to emphasize,  though,  that measuring  excess  demand  in the 
price  dimension  rather  than the employment  dimension  is an alternative, 
not a necessary  additional,  feature  of the theory.  There  is nothing  theo- 
retically  deficient  about a model in which unemployment  is the measure 
of excess  demand. 
The Phillips  curves  fitted  by Gordon and others  who believe  in a sig- 
nificant  feedback  from prices  to wages do not contain the gap between 
the  level  of prices  and  the level  of costs. Rather,  they  use the rate  of change 
of prices  in place of the rate of change  of wages  in the second  term  of the 
Phillips  curve,  which  deals  with expectations.  I do not believe  that this is 
a correct  implication  of the view that price  less marginal  cost is a better 
measure  of excess  demand  than is unemployment.  Further,  I know of no 
convincing  rationale  for the presence  of expected  price inflation  rather 
than  expected  wage  inflation  in the second  term  of the Phillips  curve.  The 
only plausible  justification  is that prices are better predictors  of future 
wage inflation  than is the recent  history  of wages themselves.  I find this 
view unconvincing.  It is significant  that Gordon and Michael Wachter 
(in his paper  in this issue)  find that the price  index that performs  best in 
the Phillips  curve  is the price of value added,  which is most like a wage 
because  it excludes  imports. 
22. Gordon has used implicit price deflators  rather  than consumer  price indexes in 
the favored  equations  of most of his many papers in BPEA on the Phillips curve. As 
his discussion  of this paper  shows, he favors  the price of the product  that labor is pro- 
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I think the theoretical case for a feedback from prices to wages other 
than through the excess demand for labor remains to be worked out. I am 
prepared  to defend my omission of such a feedback from the view of the 
process of wage inflation advocated in this paper. There is no point in a 
dogmatic position,  however, since  the  economy  is  in  the  midst  of  an 
accidental experiment with divergent movements of prices and wages. In 
another year a good deal of new evidence will be available on this question. 
APPENDIX  A 
Survey  of Related Work  on 
Wages  and Unemployment 
FOR  THE  PURPOSES  of  this discussion I will distinguish four groups of 
economists with divergent views on the theory of wage changes and un- 
employment: labor economists,  search theorists, turnover theorists, and 
students of wage drift. 
Labor economists have always been uncomfortable with the notion  of 
a  Phillips curve in  which the  unemployment rate has  a  major role  in 
determining changes in  wages. Their unease began long  before A.  W. 
Phillips' paper of 1958. The following remarkable passage appears in John 
T. Dunlop's  classic  Wage Determination under Trade Unions, published 
in 1944: 
A cherished  view among  economists  has been that wage rates advance  in any 
market  when unemployment  has been reduced  below a "critical"  level and are 
reduced  when unemployment  exceeds another "critical"  level. Ordinarily  the 
proposition is stated in terms of the wage structure  for a total system. The 
industrial  sequence  of wage  variation  suggested  in this chapter  would  render  the 
first  formulation  of the proposition  invalid.  Wages  fell last (and probably  least) 
in the sector of the economy in which unemployment  was clearly relatively 
greatest  and rose first  where  it was also relatively  greatest.' 
Dunlop's alternative view, widely held among labor economists today, is 
expressed clearly in his book: The labor market is not a bourse-it  is not 
1. (Macmillan),  pp. 147-48. See also A. W. Phillips, "The Relation Between Un- 
employment  and the Rate of Change of Money Wage Rates in the United Kingdom, 
1861-1957,"  Economica,  N.S., Vol. 25 (November  1958),  pp. 283-99 382  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1974 
a market  where  buyers  and sellers  deal symmetrically  with each other  to 
negotiate  prices.  Rather,  employers  quote fixed wages to potential  em- 
ployees on a "take it or leave it" basis. Negotiation over wage levels 
between individual  workers and employers  almost never occurs. The 
quoted  or scale  wage  is set bureaucratically  and by collective  bargaining, 
and the major  consideration  in setting  it is the past history  of wages in 
related  industries.  Dunlop  discusses  at length  the hypothesis  that a whole 
series  of wage  increases  can be set off by an increase  in a single  key wage. 
This view remains  influential  today; many advocates  of wage controls 
believe  that the wages  of only a few key industries  need be controlled  to 
restrain  inflation  in the entire  labor market.  Dunlop also demonstrates 
in some detail  that the effective  wage differs  from the scale wage,  a topic 
that has since  received  almost  no attention  among  American  economists. 
He attributes  the gap between  the two wages  to overtime  premiums  and 
to variations  in the productivity  of workers  paid  on the  basis  of piecework, 
and not to upgrading  within  the firm.  He takes the strong  position  that 
the scale  wage  is the true  cost of labor  and that variations  in the effective 
wage around  it are merely  statistical  artifacts. 
The theory  of this paper  starts  from the labor economist's  observation 
that the labor market  is not a bourse.  In particular,  the unemployed  do 
not bid the wage down through  personal  negotiation  with employers.  I 
depart  from Dunlop's  view, however,  that the scale wage is the cost of 
labor input. When firms choose to  pay overtime  rather than expand 
employment,  the alternative  of expanding  employment  must  be even  more 
expensive.  Similarly,  cyclical  upgrading  increases  the true cost of labor. 
Except  for piecework  (which  is much  less common  now than thirty  years 
ago), it seems to me that the effective  wage-specifically, the marginal 
effective  wage-is  the appropriate  measure  of the cost of labor. This is a 
critical  point,  for it means  that variations  in the quality  of labor in given 
jobs substitute  for direct  negotiation  of wages as a mechanism  of wage 
adjustment.  I think that labor economists  seriously  understate  the re- 
sponsiveness  of the wage to conditions  in the labor market.  As a con- 
sequence,  I believe  they  overstate  the importance  of the direct  transmission 
of wage  increases  from  one industry  to another.  Wage  increases  in related 
industries  are, of course,  highly  correlated,  but this can be explained  by 
their  similar  responses  to fluctuations  in the labor  market  they share. 
One labor  economist,  Melvin  Reder,  has stated  clearly  the proposition 
that quality  variations  function  in the short run to make effective  wages Robert  E. Hall  383 
responsive to the supply and demand for labor-the  position I adopted 
here. He has written: 
Wage rates paid for particular  jobs are not analogous  to factor prices. The 
skill and other characteristics  of workers  who apply for given jobs vary with 
the state of the labor  market.... 
Quality  variations  in labor  markets  arise  through  upgrading  and downgrading 
of members  of the labor  force relative  to the jobs they are to fill.... 
Shifting  workers,  reclassifying  jobs, etc., are  more  or less  continuous  processes, 
and therefore  not subject  to the time-lags  attendant  upon changing  contractual 
prices,  i.e., union wage rates.2 
Reder is concerned mainly with the implications of quality variations for 
the  cyclical behavior of  occupational wage  differentials, and  does  not 
consider their role in a theory of the evolution of the average wage. 
Search theorists represent  the polar extreme to the views of labor econo- 
mists. In the most carefully and fully articulated exposition of the search 
theory, that of  Mortensen, employers set wages for jobs  in  immediate 
response to shifts in the supply function for labor facing them.3 Workers 
quit to look for new work when they feel that wages available elsewhere 
are enough better to justify the investment in a period of search. Quits are 
the only source of turnover in Mortensen's theory. They are the result of 
faulty expectations on the part of employers and workers. The unreality of 
this aspect of the theory has been pointed out forcefully by Tobin.4 Quits 
are never an important source of  unemployment, and they are least im- 
portant when unemployment is highest. A second defect of Mortensen's 
theory has received less attention: He assumes that the weekly probability 
of a job offer is a constant independent of conditions in the labor market. 
Employers make larger numbers of offers at lower wages when the unem- 
ployment rate is high. The unemployed individual sees a slackening in the 
market not as a decline in the availability of work but as a reduction in 
the wages paid by the jobs  available. Again,  this is unrealistic. All  the 
evidence suggests the opposite: quoted scale wages respond more slowly 
to conditions in the market and the immediate change seen by job seekers 
2. M. W. Reder, "The Theory  of Occupational  Wage Differentials,"  American  Eco- 
nomic  Review,  Vol. 45 (December  1955), pp. 834, 835. 
3. "A Theory of Wage and Employment  Dynamics,"  in Phelps and others, Micro- 
economic  Foundations. 
4. "Inflation  and Unemployment,"  p. 7. See also Roger Brinner,  "The  Accelerationist 
Model: A Correct  Conclusion  for the Wrong  Reason"  (Harvard  University,  March  1974; 
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when  the market  slackens  is fewer  prospects  per week. I emphasize  once 
more that employers  do not pay a large cost for their failure  to adjust 
wages  instantly;  they  get almost  the same  effect  from  changes  in the quality 
of their  labor  forces  as they  would  from  variations  in the scale  wage.5 
Turnover  theorists,  notably Tobin and Holt, discuss  the operation  of 
the labor  market  in terms  closest to those presented  here. In Section  IV 
of "Inflation  and  Unemployment,"  Tobin sketches  a theory  of "stochastic 
macro-equilibrium"  that is generally  harmonious  with the views of this 
paper.6  Tobin begins  with a distinction  between  the equilibrium  and dis- 
equilibrium  components  of changes in wages: "The first is the rate at 
which the wage would increase  were the market in equilibrium,  with 
neither  vacancies  nor unemployment.  The other  component  is a function 
of excess demand and supply...  ."7  These correspond roughly to the scale 
wage and the difference  between  the effective  and scale wages in my ex- 
position.  According  to Tobin, macro-equilibrium  occurs  at a positive  un- 
employment  rate  because  of "shocks  of demand  and technology  that keep 
[individual]  markets  in perpetual  disequilibrium"  (p. 10). Thus turnover 
has a central  role in Tobin's thinking.  In each market,  an unspecified 
process  restores  equilibrium  by raising  wages  in the face of excess  demand 
and depressing  them in the face of excess supply.  The equilibrium  com- 
ponent  of the wage  evolves  in response  to wages  elsewhere  in the economy 
and possibly  to its own past values.  At the conclusion,  Tobin comes  close 
to endorsing Dunlop's view of the influence of key wages: ". . . accidental 
5. In a related  paper-"Job Search,  the Duration  of Unemployment,  and the Phillips 
Curve,"  American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 60 (December  1970),  pp. 847-62-Mortensen 
considers  a model in which both quality and the wage are instruments  of recruiting 
policy.  However,  his measure  of wages is essentially  the same as my scale wage, and he 
does not consider  the implications  of changes in the composition of employment  for 
the effective  wage or unit labor cost. In his second  model, the availability  of work does 
vary  in response  to the unemployment  rate,  but workers  remain  ignorant  of the variation. 
6. Parts  of Tobin's  theory  were anticipated  by Richard  Lipsey in "The Relation Be- 
tween Unemployment  and the Rate of Change of Money Wage Rates in the United 
Kingdom,  1862-1957:  A Further  Analysis,"  Economica,  N.S., Vol. 27 (February  1960), 
pp. 1-31; and G. C. Archibald  in "Wage-Price  Dynamics, Inflation, and Unemploy- 
ment," in American  Economic Association,  Papers and Proceedings  of the Eighty-first 
Annual  Meeting, 1968 (American  Economic  Review, Vol. 59, May 1969), pp. 124-34. 
Although  Tobin does not seem to have written on the subject  before 1971, his theory 
became  an important  part of the oral macroeconomic  tradition  at the Cowles Founda- 
tion many years  earlier. 
7. "Inflation  and Unemployment,"  p. 9. Robert E. Hall  385 
circumstances  affecting  strategic  wage  settlements  also  cast a long shadow" 
(p. 13). 
Tobin's theory  differs  from the model of this paper in two respects. 
First, he leaves  unanswered  the basic question  of how wages change in 
response  to  disequilibrium  in individual  markets. Holt has addressed 
exactly  this question  from  the point of view of turnover  theory,  but I will 
indicate  shortly  the defects  I find  in his theory.  Second,  the model of the 
evolution  of the scale or equilibrium  component  of the wage developed 
here  starts  from rather  a different  point. In Tobin's  economy,  employers 
and  unions  are  in considerable  doubt  as to the appropriate  level of wages; 
they need "reference  standards"  from past history  and other industries. 
Tobin  even  remarks:  "Wage  rates  for existing  employees  set the standards 
for new employees,  too" (p. 12). In this model, just the opposite  holds. 
The  marginal  effective  wage,  the wage  paid  to new employees,  is precisely 
the indicator  of the appropriate  wage  level for existing  employees  needed 
by both employers  and unions.  No reference  to other  industries  is needed. 
The theories  wind up at similar  conclusions,  however.  They both imply 
that the scale or equilibrium  component  of the wage evolves according 
to a difference  equation  that is shifted  upward  or downward  by the dis- 
equilibrium  wage-adjustment  function. 
Charles  Holt's contributions  to turnover  theory  are complementary  to 
Tobin's.8  Holt is most concerned  with the actual  process  by which  wages 
change.  He takes the flow through  the labor market  as a given constant 
(an empirical  regularity  I have called Holt's law above), and studies  the 
implications  of the search  rules followed by job seekers  for the rate of 
change of the average  wage level. In his model job seekers  set an "as- 
piration  wage" when they begin looking for work. As their stretch of 
unemployment  lengthens,  they become less confident  of finding  work at 
the aspiration  level  and  begin  lowering  it. At low unemployment  rates,  job 
seekers  find work rapidly,  when  they are still accepting  only high-paying 
jobs. In slack  markets,  the long duration  of unemployment  forces  aspira- 
tions down far enough so that the jobs eventually  taken pay below the 
prevailing  wage. A central  feature of the model of this paper is taken 
8. "Job Search,  Phillips'  Wage Relation, and Union Influence";  and James  Tobin, 
"How Can  the Phillips  Curve  be Moved to Reduce  Both Inflation  and Unemployment?" 
in Phelps and  others,  Microeconornic Foundations. 386  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1974 
directly  from  Holt: wages  rise in tight markets  because  workers  changing 
jobs take new  jobs with higher  wages,  and drop  in slack  markets  because 
new  jobs have  lower  wages.  However,  the influence  underlying  this process 
in my theory  is rather  different.  In my model  job seekers  set their  cutoff 
or aspiration  wage in response  to conditions  in the labor market.  Even 
in the first  week  of search,  whether  they take a particular  job depends  on 
the availability  of other  jobs, as measured  by the probability  of locating 
other  prospects.  By contrast,  in Holt's model workers  arbitrarily  set their 
initial  aspiration  wage  to their  past wage  plus a constant  increment.  Their 
response  to conditions  in the market  occurs only slowly as they remain 
unemployed.  The behavior  assumed  by Holt conflicts  with the evidence 
that workers  have  fairly  good information  about the availability  of work 
within  their  own labor  markets.  The equation  in my model is compatible 
with Holt's  theory  of wage  change  as well as mine,  however. 
Tobin,  Holt,  and  other  turnover  theorists  refer  extensively  to the concept 
of  job vacancies  in their  expositions.  On  the other  hand,  I have  constructed 
a complete  model without a single reference  to the concept. I am con- 
cerned  that  the symmetry  of unemployed  workers  and  unfilled  jobs derives 
from  the false  belief  that  both represent  unused  resources.  An unemployed 
worker  is certainly  an unused  resource  but a vacancy  is not. The proper 
analog of an unemployed  worker  is an unemployed  machine or other 
complementary  input.  An employer  maintains  a stock  of  jobs in the process 
of being  filled  precisely  to avoid idle capital. 
In countries  that have attempted  to control inflation  through  incomes 
policies, economists  have paid close attention  to the gap between  scale 
and effective  wages,  known  in this context  as "wage  drift."  The tendency 
for actual  wage  increases  to exceed  negotiated  or controlled  increases  has 
frustrated  incomes  policies  in a number  of countries.  A substantial  litera- 
ture on the relation  between  wage drift and the excess demand  for labor 
has emerged,  starting  with the major  contribution  of Hansen  and Rehn.9 
Subsequent  work on this problem by continental  and British econo- 
mists has been too extensive  to cite or discuss individually  here, but 
generally  follows the pattern  established  by Hansen and Rehn.10  Wage 
9. Bent Hansen and G6sta Rehn, "On Wage-Drift: A Problem of Money-Wage 
Dynamics,"  in 25 Economic  Essays in Honour  of Erik Lindahl  (Stockholm:  Ekonomisk 
Tidskrift,  1956). 
10. A few American  economists  have  written  on the subject,  but always  with  reference 
to European  economies,  as far as I know. Lloyd Ulman and Robert J. Flanagan  deal Robert  E. Hall  387 
drift  arises  from  three  sources:  changes  in the productivity  of pieceworkers, 
variations  in overtime,  and variations  in actual straight-time  rates from 
scale rates. Many authors  mention  upgrading  within  the firm as part of 
the third source,  and Hansen  and Rehn suggest  as an aside that move- 
ments of workers  among firms  has the same effect. However,  turnover 
and the mobility  of labor  do not have  a large  role in any of the discussions 
of wage  drift.  Most  studies  take  the point  of view  of the empirical  literature 
on the Phillips  curve: there is a gross empirical  relation between un- 
employment  and wage  changes  arising  from an unexplained  influence  of 
excess  demand  on wages. 
APPENDIX B 
Evolution  of the Wage  under 
Collective  Bargaining 
THE CONTENT  of this appendix  appears  in Figure  B-1. Ex ante,  collective 
bargaining  has established  the scale wage,  so. This is a point on the mar- 
ginal revenue  product  schedule,  called MRPLo. The corresponding  level 
of employment  is Lo. However, demand turns out to be higher than 
expected,  and MRPL1 is the firm's actual demand  function for labor. 
Collective  bargaining  has established  a set of rules  by which  labor input 
can be increased,  primarily  through  promotion  of existing  workers  and 
new hiring  at the entry  level.  The result  is seen  by the firm  as the marginal 
effective  wage schedule,  MEW, the supply function to the firm in the 
short  run.  Ex post,  the firm  employs  L1  at a marginal  effective  wage  of w. 
If collective  bargaining  had  taken  place  after  the shift  in demand,  then  the 
scale wage  would  have  been sot,  and employment  would  have remained  at 
Lo. After the unexpected  shift in demand and consequent  unexpected 
increase  in employment,  the union has responsibility  for an increased 
membership.  The scale wage giving  employment  to its new membership, 
extensively  with the subject  in Wage  Restraint:  A Study of Incomes  Policies in Western 
Europe (University of California  Press, 1971). See also Orley Ashenfelter and John 
Pencavel,  "A Note on Estimating  the Determinants  of Changes  in Wages  and Earnings," 
Working  Paper  46 (Princeton  University,  Industrial  Relations Section, 1974). 388  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1974 
Figure  B-1.  Inpact  of Unexpected  Shift  in Demand  for  Labor  in an Industry 
with  Union  Collective  Bargaining 
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Source: See accompanying text in Appendix B, where the symbols are defined. 
with demand  given  by MRPL1, is sl, which  is the same as wl. By setting 
this wage,  the union collects the intramarginal  part of the new wage bill, 
(s  -  wl)(Ll-LO),  which accrues to the firm in the first instance. In the 
figure,  AEW  signifies  the average  effective  wage. 
APPENDIX  C 
Strategies  of Job Seekers 
LET  F(w*) be the probability  that the wage quoted  for a particular  pros- 
pect is less than a cutoff  wage, wO.  I assume  that the probability  distribu- 
tion for the prospects  available  to a worker  of grade  j is F(w*/srj);  all 
prospective  wages  rise  in proportion  to the scale  wage,  and  the distribution Robert  E. Hall  389 
is higher  for higher  grades  in proportion  to the wage  structure  as measured 
by r,. The strategy  consists  in setting  a cutoff  wage, w*, and continuing  to 
look for work  until a prospect  appears  that pays a wage at least as high 
as w*. Then  the weekly  probability  of taking  a job, h, is the product  of 
the probability  of locating a prospect  and the probability  of taking  the 
prospect: 
h(w*)  =  p  I  -  F  sr, 
Suppose,  as in the text, that there  is a constant  probability,  0, of losing or 
leaving  a job each week. Then  the worker  expects  to be employed  only a 
fraction  of the time, 
m(w*)  h(w*) 
h(w*) ?  q 
Now the expected  wage upon accepting  a job is 
w  (W*  =  1-  (cf  (  d@, 
which  exceeds  w*. In this expression,  f is the probability  density  function 
associated  with the cumulative  distribution  function,  F; 
srjX 
is used to scale for the probability  of the worker's  accepting  the job. 
The expected  weekly return  is the product of the fraction of the time 
employed  and the average  wage when employed,  m(w*)w'(w*).  I assume 
that the job seeker  sets w* to maximize  this return.  It turns  out that the 
optimal  strategy  is to take any  job that pays at least as much as the ex- 
pected return  to the combination  of waiting and working.  Thus w* is 
defined  implicitly  by 
w*  =  m(w*)w'(w*). 
How does the strategy,  measured  by w*, respond  to changes  in condi- 
tions in the labor market?  It is not hard  to show that 
dW*e  , am ah 
wt  w ahc ap 
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constant distribution  of the wages of job prospects,  the tighter is the 
market  (the higher  is p), the more selective  is each  job seeker  in deciding 
whether  to take a prospect.  For the worker  making  the optimal  choice 
of w*, w', the average  new wage,  becomes  a function  of s, ri, and  p: 
w  =  srig(p). 
The function  g(p) will exceed one when the market  is tight and will be 
less than one when  it is slack. 
APPENDIX D 
Data Sources 
THE FOLLOWING  paragraphs  detail the sources  for the data used in the 
study  of five  manufacturing  employers  and  in the aggregate  wage  equation. 
Five  Manufacturing  Employers 
SCALE WAGES 
Chronologies  of wage changes  determined  by collective  bargaining  are 
published  by the Bureau of National Affairs in Collective  Bargaining: 
Negotiations  and Contracts  (updated  periodically).  The chronologies  give 
the  month  and  year  of each  change,  including  deferred  increases  negotiated 
in earlier  years  and  increases  under  cost-of-living  escalators.  Starting  from 
a benchmark  in 1958, I applied the reported  changes cumulatively  to 
obtain  annual  averages  of the scale  wage.  The  benchmark  was the straight- 
time  average  hourly  earnings  in the industry  of the employer  as calculated 
by the U.S. Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  (see below). 
BLS WAGE 
Employment  and  Earnings  reports  gross  average  hourly  earnings,  average 
overtime hours, and average hours. The Bureau of  National Affairs Robert  E. Hall  391 
calculates average straight-time hours from these data on the assumption 
that all overtime is paid at time and a half. The data appear in Collective 
Bargaining. Employers and industries are matched as follows: 
Employer  Industry  and  SIC code 
Clothing  manufacturers  (men's)  Men's and boys' suits and coats (231) 
General  Motors  Corporation  Motor vehicles  and equipment  (371) 
General  Electric  Company  Electrical  equipment  and supplies  (36) 
B. F. Goodrich  Company  Tires and inner  tubes (301) 
American  Viscose  Division,  Weaving  mills, synthetics  (222) 
FMC Corporation 
WAGE  DATA  FROM FRANK  GOLLOP 
Gollop  constructed his indexes of labor input by calculating estimates 
of  employment and annual hours of  work cross-classified by  sex,  age, 
education, and occupation.' He uses an elaborate interpolation procedure 
to form these estimates from detailed data from the Census of Population, 
less detailed annual data from the  Current Population Survey, and in- 
dustry aggregates from establishment data, all collected by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. He then weights these measures of labor input of the 
various demographic and occupational groups by their relative rates of 
compensation  to  form  indexes  of  total  labor  input  to  the  industries. 
Rather than using fixed weights throughout the period, he forms a chain 
or Divisia index by linking together estimates of annual changes in labor 
input. For each annual change he holds the weights constant, so his index 
is not very different from a fixed-weight index, and seems an appropriate 
one for my purposes. The series for effective wages by industries is then 
calculated as the ratio of total compensation (including supplements) to 
the index of labor input. Employers and industries are matched as follows: 
Employer  Industry 
Clothing  manufacturers  (men's)  Apparel  and other  fabricated  textile  products 
General  Motors  Motor  vehicles  and  motor vehicle  equipment 
General  Electric  Electrical  machinery 
B. F. Goodrich  Rubber and miscellaneous  plastic products 
American  Viscose  Textile  mill products 
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UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 
Employment  and Earnings  reports  the unemployment  rate for workers 
who are employed  in blue-collar  jobs or whose most recent  occupations 
were  blue-collar  (craftsmen,  operatives,  and laborers).  A regression  of the 
blue-collar  rate,  UB,  on the official  rate,  uo, gives 
UB  =  -  1.7 +  1.6 uo. 
Aggregate  Wage  Equation 
WAGE  DATA  FROM PETER  CHINLOY 
Chinloy  applies  a method similar  to Gollop's in calculating  a Divisia 
index  of labor  input  to the total private  domestic  U.S. economy.2  A partic- 
ularly  useful  contribution  is his detailed  reconciliation  of the disparities 
in the two major  sources  for data on employment,  the household  survey 
and the establishment  survey  of the BLS. Again, the effective  wage is the 
ratio of total compensation  from the national income accounts  to the 
index  of total labor  input. 
UNEMPLOYMENT INDEX  WITH  FIXED  WEIGHTS 
The index  has the form 
UF =  vii. 
The weight, vi, reflects  the contribution  of demographic  group i to the 
unemployment  of labor input measured  in efficiency  units in the base 
year, 1964. Each weight was calculated  by multiplying  George Perry's 
wage-hour  weight3  by the fraction  of the labor  force in the group  in 1964. 
The weights,  normalized  to sum to one, are as follows: 
2. Chinloy,  "Issues  in the Measurement  of Labor Input," Chap. 1. 
3. "Changing  Labor Markets  and Inflation,"  pp. 439-41. Robert  E. Hall  393 
Age group  Male  Female 
16-17  0.006  0.004 
18-19  0.006  0.007 
20-24  0.054  0.025 
25-34  0.186  0.035 
35-44  0.210  0.048 
45-54  0.187  0.048 
55-64  0.126  0.029 
65 and over  0.023  0.006 
The official  aggregate  unemployment  rate, uo, has a noticeable  upward 
trend  relative  to UF,  owing to the shift in the composition  of the labor 
force  toward  groups  with  high unemployment  rates.  The relation  between 
the two is described  fairly  well by the following  regression: 
uo =  0.76 +  1.033  UF +  0.059t. 
The trend  variable,  t, has the value -1  in 1963,  0 in 1964, 1 in 1965,  and 
so forth.  In ten years,  uO shifts upward  relative  to U,  by 0.6 percentage 
point. 